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RULE 19 AND THE PUBLIC RIGHTS 
EXCEPTION TO PARTY JOINDER 
CARL TOBIASt 
The increasing number of "public interest" lawsuits suggests that 
federal courts increasingly will confront difficult party joinder questions 
posed by such litigation. These problems arise because entities not in-
volved in the litigation may have interests that may be adversely affected 
by the litigation. The joinder issue presented by such cases is whether 
rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the suit be 
dismissed or whether the litigation can continue without joinder of the 
absent entities. Numerous courts have dealt with the question by creat-
ing a ''public rights exception," which permits the litigation to continue 
even without absentees whose interests may be at risk. However, no 
court has clearly articulated or analyzed this exception. Because of this 
failure, adoption of the exception has not resolved all of the joinder 
problems raised by public rights litigation. In this Article Professor To-
bias considers whether there is a better solution to these problems. 
First, Professor Tobias considers the origins of the public rights ex-
ception. He then evaluates the judicial articulation of the exception and 
reveals that courts have not explained the exception adequately or exhib-
ited concern for interests other than those of the plaintiff. Professor To-
bias then examines the procedural and statutory mechanisms currently 
available for treating this party joinder issue. He concludes that the 
courts should abandon the public rights exception and resolve the join-
der question by applying these other mechanisms. 
Federal courts increasingly confront a difficult question of party joinder 
when "public interest litigants," such as the National Wildlife Federation, sue 
the government over administrative agency activity. 1 These public interest liti-
gants challenge an activity, like leasing of the public lands, but fail to join enti-
ties, such as major oil companies, holding oil and gas leases on the public lands. 
t Professor of Law, University of Montana. I greatly appreciate the efforts of Rich Freer, 
Elizabeth Gibson, Bill Luneburg, Richard Marcus, Peggy Sanner, Allan Stein, and Mark Weisburd 
all of whom labored mightily to help me understand rule 19. Thanks also to Bradley Purcell for 
valuable research assistance, the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support, and Beth Stevenson 
and Bonita Summers for typing this Article. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. A "public interest litigant" is an advocacy group that represents "unorganized 'public inter-
ests,'-interests shared by large numbers of individuals (such as consumers ... ) who are not well 
enough organized to pool their mutual stake in agency policies and participate effectively in the 
informal administrative process on a par with .•. other organized economic interests." S. BREYER 
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 1185 (2d ed. 1985). "Public 
interest" or "public law" litigation is the activity pursued by public interest litigants before agencies 
or courts to vindicate these interests. For general discussions of public interest litigants and litiga-
tion, see Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and The Burger Court, The Supreme Court 1981 
Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Law Litigation]; 
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1975). 
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The entities have interests that may be adversely affected by a determination on 
the merits favorable to the plaintiff. The party joinder issue that these suits 
present is whether rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 requires that 
the plaintiff's case be dismissed, whether absentees must be joined because join-
der is feasible, or whether the litigation can continue without joinder of such 
absentees. Numerous judges have treated this question by creating a "public 
rights exception," which permits the plaintiff's suit to proceed in the absence of 
entities that could be prejudiced should the litigation continue without them. 
But no court has clearly articulated, analyzed, or substantiated the exception. 
Moreover, most of these judges, out of apparent concern that plaintiffs have a 
forum in which to contest agency activity and vindicate public rights, 3 have 
evinced little express solicitude for interests of others, particularly absentees. 
Furthermore, the plethora of varying factual contexts in which courts have been 
asked to apply the public rights exception are difficult to generalize. The history 
of recent public rights litigation, however, illustrates the problems that can at-
tend invocation of the public rights exception. 
In recent public rights litigation, trial judges have not required joinder of a 
large number of geographically dispersed absentees that have spent millions of 
2. Rule 19 provides: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and 
whosejoinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be ac-
corded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, 
the court shall order that he be made a party. Ifhe should join as a plaintiff but refuses to 
do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the 
joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action im-
proper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in 
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to 
be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other meas-
ures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate rem-
edy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state 
the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) 
hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 19. For brief descriptions of the rule, see infra notes 42-46, 126-32 and accompany-
ing text. For thorough analysis, see 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 19 
(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1601-26 (1972). 
3. For example, several environmental groups recently vindicated all citizens' interest in envi-
ronmental quality by suing to restrain the National Park Service (NPS) "from approving mining 
plans and access permits in Alaska's national parks until" the NPS complied with the National 
Environmental Policy Act and its own regulations. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 
803 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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dollars exploring for, and developing, natural resources in reliance on govern-
ment leases of public lands. When public interest litigants have successfully 
challenged the propriety of government activity relating to lease issuance, trial 
judges essentially have discontinued absentee exploration and development pur-
suant to the leases. Thus, the absentees have had to spend considerable time, 
money, and effort participating in prolonged litigation. Indeed, the absentees 
even could lose the substantial investments committed to exploration and devel-
opment, should the federal judiciary ultimately reject their contentions, because 
the absentees cannot secure satisfactory relief against the government under ex-
isting compensation schemes.4 In short, trial judges have not orderedjoinder of 
absentees, despite the apparent significance of the absentees' interests. 
Notwithstanding these complications, numerous courts that have recog-
nized the public rights exception seem to have resolved correctly the relevant 
party joinder question, especially by honoring rule 19's strong concern for pro-
viding the plaintiff a forum. It is difficult, however, to determine definitively if 
most of these judges made appropriate decisions in light of rule 19's require-
ments or whether they properly completed the inquiry contemplated by the rule. 
Moreover, it is impossible to determine how the remaining courts resolved the 
joinder issue. Even if the conclusions reached were correct, the uncertainty en-
gendered by the courts' lack of clarity has disrupted operations conducted by 
absentees that were not required to be joined in the public rights suits. That 
uncertainty has also led to protracted litigation, wasting public and private re-
sources and undermining judicial credibility. Because public rights litigation is 
burgeoning, the party joinder question that the public rights exception was fash-
ioned to address will increasingly arise. These considerations make it important 
to determine if there is a better solution to the joinder problem. 
The first section of this Article analyzes the origins of the public rights 
exception. The second section evaluates judicial articulation of the public rights 
exception and reveals that courts have neither clearly enunciated the exception 
nor expressly exhibited concern for pertinent interests other than those of the 
plaintiffs. Moreover, this assessment suggests that the federal judiciary's recog-
nition of the public rights exception was unwarranted. Accordingly, the third 
section explores the procedural mechanisms currently available for treating the 
party joinder issue addressed by the exception. Because this analysis demon-
strates that these measures will enable courts not only to facilitate plaintiffs' 
vindication of public rights but also to accommodate other relevant interests, the 
Article concludes that the federal judiciary should abandon the public rights 
4. The absentees cannot secure satisfactory relief because the government may have no techni-
cal legal obligation to them or the harm suffered may not support a cause of action. See infra notes 
238-39 and accompanying text. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 
(D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and Conner v. Burford, 
605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986) illus-
trate the problems that can occur. For more comprehensive analysis of other contexts in which 
courts have invoked the exception, see infra text accompanying notes 75-94. One of the most prob-
lematic difficulties in treating the exception is explaining how the party joinder question arises. 
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exception and resolve the party joinder question by applying the additional 
mechanisms. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
A. Early Party Joinder Concepts 
1. Developments Prior to the Adoption of Original Federal Rule 19 
English equity courts attempted to join every entity that had some interest 
in a particular action, so as to minimize the possibilities of multiple and inconsis-
tent litigation. 5 But comprehensive joinder was not a prerequisite to pursuit of a 
claim or to entry of judgment before 1800. 6 At the end of the eighteenth century 
the equity courts began finding certain entities so integrally related to specific 
litigation that the case could not proceed in their absence. 7 For example, Lord 
Chancellor Thurlow's 1787 decision in Fell v. Brown 8 was read as stating that a 
second mortgagee's suit, which sought an accounting of rents and profits from a 
first mortgagee, could not continue in the absence of the heir of the deceased 
mortgagor.9 Judges in the United States subscribed to this change. Although 
the modification was said to be "imported" by Justice Washington's 1806 opin-
ion in Joy v. Wirtz, 10 the alteration was articulated most authoritatively in the 
factually similar, 1855 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Shields v. 
Barrow. 11 
In Shields plaintiff sought to rescind an agreement with six people but did 
not sue four of them, because their presence in the litigation would have de-
stroyed diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to permit the case to 
proceed without the four individuals whose interests could have been adversely 
affected. The Court apparently premised its determination on the distinction 
between "necessary" parties, who should be sued and "indispensable" parties, 
such as the four absentees, who must be joined and in whose absence it would be 
unfair to continue: 
Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be 
made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which re-
5. See Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-58 (1961); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 358-59 (1967); 
Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 331 (1957). 
6. "Equity .•• tolerated the absence of an interested person when it was shown that joinder 
was impossible, or impractical, or involved undue complication ... because the chancellors appre-
hended that doing an incomplete job in a litigation would often be better than doing no job at all." 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359; see Hazard, supra note 5, at 1268-75. 
7. "Under the influence of the heady slogans of 'doing perfect justice' and 'making complete 
decrees,' " the chancery premised its determinations on abstract categorizations of absentees as "in-
dispensable." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359; see Hazard, supra note 5, at 1268-75. 
8. 2 Bro. C.C. 276, 29 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1787). 
9. Fell became the leading case and was read inflexibly for the proposition that litigation must 
be dismissed whenever any absentee who was "indispensable" could not be joined. See Hazard, 
supra note 5, at 1274-77. 
IO. 13 F. Cas. 1172 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 7553-54); cf Hazard, supra note 5, at 1278-82 
(analysis of Joy); Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359 {discussing this "importation"). 
11. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855). 
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quires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and 
do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it ... are 
commonly termed necessary parties; but if their interests are separable 
from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can pro-
ceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting 
other persons not before the court, [they] are not indispensable par-
ties .... Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but 
an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without 
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a con-
dition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity 
and good conscience [are indispensable parties].12 
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The Court failed to mention specifically all the relevant factors that led it to 
resolve the party joinder question by ordering dismissal of plaintiff's claim. 
Therefore, although the Court might have resolved the joinder issue properly, 
that conclusion can be reached only by making certain assumptions about the 
reasoning the Court employed or by considering particulars not stated in 
Shields, such as the practical implications of dismissal.13 
The Shields Court's classification of parties as necessary or indispensable, 
however, was most important to the development of party joinder ideas over the 
subsequent century. That categorization underlies what commentators have 
characterized as a "jurisprudence oflabels"14 or the "classification of cases by a 
kind of sloganeering process in which important factual detail was over-
looked." 15 Judges, assessing circumstances in which absentee joinder was infea-
sible, did not evaluate thoroughly, much less pragmatically or flexibly, all 
considerations present in specific situations.16 Rather, courts rigidly relied on 
concepts of "separability" or "jointness." Thus, judges assigned the conclusory 
label "indispensable" to absentees-such as the four unjoined original endorsers 
of the note in Shields-whose interests were considered ''joint" or "common" or 
"united in interest" with entities in the litigation. If an absent party were held to 
be indispensable, the court dismissed the case.17 
2. Original Federal Rule 19 
Adopted in 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 was intended to facili-
tate more comprehensive packaging of suits and to minimize multiple litigation 
12. Id. at 139. 
13. Thus, although "the Court left unmentioned that the plaintiff Barrow might possibly lack 
access to any court in which all parties could be joined, so that dismissal of the instant suit might 
leave him remediless,'' Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362, Professor Kaplan has noted that other consider-
ations not stated in Shields might indicate the Court resolved the joinder issue properly, id. 
14. See c. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 70, at 458 (4th ed. 1983); see also Reed, 
supra note 5, at 329 (cases revealed "ready reliance on labels [and] thoughtless reiteration-instead 
of a critical reexamination-of the basic principles of required joinder"). 
15. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362. 
16. For helpful descriptions of judicial treatment, see Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A 
Proposal To Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1061, 1075-76 (1985); Kaplan, supra 
note 5, at 362. The advisability of proceeding was an important consideration that judges neglected. 
17. "It fostered an inward analysis of the nature of the rights asserted, rather than an outward 
assessment of the pros and cons of continuing with the particular case in the face of some incom-
pleteness of the dramatis personae." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362. 
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"by abandoning the mystical, inefficient, and narrower old tests in favor of a 
simpler and broader inquiry ... along transactional lines."18 But the rule failed 
to affect significantly the deficiencies in judicial treatment of the party joinder 
issue that had developed over the preceding 100 years. 19 The rule employed the 
familiar concepts of "necessary" and "indispensable" parties as well as ''joint 
interests." This use of traditional terminology directed the courts to focus on 
the abstract or technical nature of absentees' interests while diverting judicial 
attention from practical concerns, like hardships imposed on litigants and absen-
tees, that should have been considered more important.20 Contemporaneous 
with the adoption of original Federal Rule 19, the United States Supreme Court 
resolved several labor law issues that became important in the development of 
the public rights exception. 
B. The Public Rights Doctrine, National Licorice Company v. NLRB, and 
the Public Rights Exception 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court subscribed to a 
"public rights doctrine" that generally enshrined the government, rather than 
private entities like labor unions, as the appropriate agent for vindicating certain 
"rights" found in labor legislation.21 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,22 decided 
in 1940, was one in the line of cases espousing this doctrine. This decision was 
destined to serve as a primary source of the public rights exception.23 
In National Licorice the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had 
found an employer's procurement of labor contracts with employees to be an 
unfair labor practice and effectively rendered those contracts unenforceable. 
The NLRB made its decision in an administrative proceeding in which the em-
ployees were not parties. The employer then challenged the NLRB's determina-
tion on the basis that the Board had failed to join the employees whose contracts 
were in question. The Supreme Court rejected the employer's contention that 
the employees were "indispensable parties" who were required to be joined in 
the administrative proceeding, partly because the NLRB was vindicating statu-
torily prescribed public rights: 
18. Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-67; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 308 U.S. 687 (1938). For discus-
sions and criticisms of the 1938 rule, see Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-67, 1075-76; Kaplan, supra 
note 5, at 363-64. 
19. Widespread agreement exists on this point. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 16, at 1076; Hazard, 
supra note 5, at 1287-89; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
20. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19, Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 89, 90 (1966) [hereinafter Rule 
19 Advisory Comm. Note]; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
21. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310-18 (1978); see also Jaffe, The Public Right 
Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1946) (contemporaneous account of the doc-
trine's development). 
22. 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
23. The public rights doctrine's continuing application has not been restricted to the labor area. 
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986); Northern Pipeline Con-
str. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-72 (1982); Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially 
Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of 
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887, 955-69 (1981). 
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In a proceeding so narrowly restricted to the protection and en-
forcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the tradi-
tional rules governing the joinder of parties in litigation determining 
private rights .... 
Here the right asserted by the Board is not one arising upon or 
derived from the contracts between petitioner and its employees. The 
Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the 
public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices. 24 
751 
Considerations other than NLRB vindication of public rights, however, 
were as important to Justice Stone's resolution of National Licorice. Thus, 
although the Court's determination that the absent employees were "not indis-
pensable parties for purposes of the Board's order" was premised partially on 
agency pursuit of public rights, the finding was based as much on the order's 
ineffectiveness to "determine any private rights of the employees [who remained] 
free to assert such legal rights as they may have acquired under their con-
tracts. "25 Emphasis on the separate, rather than the public, nature of the rights 
at issue as well as concern for absentees permeate the opinion. For example, the 
Court observed that joinder might be unnecessary "in private litigation where 
the rights asserted arise independently of any contract" that a defendant may 
have with an absentee. The Court considered contractual rights "distinct and 
separate, so that the Court [could], in a proper case, proceed to judgment with-
out joining other parties to the contract, shaping its decree in such manner as to 
preserve the rights of those not before it."26 The Court expressed solicitude for 
absentees by emphasizing the difference between the statutory public rights that 
were adjudicated and the absentees' private contractual rights. These rights (1) 
were independent and not litigated, (2) should be protected assiduously by the 
court in fashioning relief, and (3) could be pursued separately by absentees.27 
The Court in National Licorice did not, however, explicitly espouse a "pub-
lic rights exception." Indeed, its resolution of the case comported with prior 
understandings of party joinder, captured in the federal rule adopted two years 
earlier. For instance, the concepts of "separable" interests held by "necessary" 
parties, in contrast to "joint" or "common" interests held by "indispensable" 
parties, were compatible with, and even implemented, those previous under-
standings. 28 The ruling in National Licorice apparently was premised as much 
on the independent character of the rights in question and fidelity to pre-existing 
party joinder ideas, as on the public nature of those rights. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court did mention vindication of public rights, and judges subse-
quently read the decision as enunciating a public rights exception. 
24. National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 363-64. 
25. Id. at 366. 
26. Id. at 363. 
27. Id. The Court also appreciated the absurdity of permitting statutory violators to avoid the 
law by inducing absentees not to require compliance with it or by conditioning compliance on absen-
tee presence. See id. at 364. 
28. See supra text accompanying notes 5-20. 
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C. Developments from 1940 to 1970 
In the three decades following National Licorice no federal judge expressly 
declared that the Court had recognized a public rights exception to party join-
der. To be sure, National Licorice was cited, but only rarely for the proposition 
that governmental agencies vindicating public rights need not join entities like 
the employee-signatories of the labor contracts in National Licorice.29 By the 
end of this period, however, there were two developments important to the crea-
tion of the public rights exception. 
1. Amendment of Rule 19 
During the mid-1960s the original rule 19 was revised, a process that 
culminated in significant restructuring of the rule in 1966.30 The changes, made 
primarily at the instigation of commentators,31 were said to be necessitated by 
experience indicating that the 1938 rule was poorly phrased and failed to state 
clearly the correct bases for deciding the party joinder question.32 Writers sug-
gested that the "use of 'indispensable' and 'joint interest' in the context of origi-
nal rule 19 directed attention to the technical or abstract character of the rights 
or obligations of the persons whose joinder was in question, and correspondingly 
distracted attention from the pragmatic considerations which should be control-
ling."33 Concomitantly, the rule failed to alert judges to the importance of flexi-
ble, practical analysis and to prescribe affirmatively those factors pertinent to 
determining if the case should continue or be dismissed when absentee joinder 
was not feasible. 34 "In some instances courts did not undertake the relevant 
inquiry [while in others] there was undue preoccupation with abstract classifica-
tions of rights or obligations, as against consideration of the particular conse-
quences of proceeding with the action and the ways by which these 
consequences might be ameliorated."35 
The proponents of revision and the drafters of the 1966 amendment ac-
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50, 54-55 (6th Cir. 1941), aff'd, 
318 U.S. 9 (1943); cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 187-90 (2d Cir. 1972) (post-1970 mention 
of public rights doctrine), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973). 
30. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 88-94; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, §§ 1601-26; Kaplan, supra note 5. The Advisory Committee Note bears the imprint of 
Professor Kaplan, the reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and is a valuable source 
for the drafters' views of the revisions. See also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1601, at 13 
(noting the weight courts accord the Advisory Note). See generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966) (contemporaneous commentary on amended rule 19). 
31. E.g., Hazard, supra note 5; Reed, supra note 5. But see Fink, Indispensable Parties and the 
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965) (criticizing the proposed 
amendment). 
32. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90; cf infra text accompanying note 
36 (even advocates of change admitted 1938 rule did not seem to have been "responsible for much 
erroneous judicial resolution of the party joinder issue"). 
33. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90; see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra 
note 2, § 1601, at 8-9; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
34. The 1938 version failed to "state affirmatively what factors were relevant in deciding 
whether the action should proceed or be dismissed when joinder of interested persons was infeasi-
ble." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90-91; see Freer, supra note 16, at 1076; 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
35. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. 
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knowledged that these problems apparently were not responsible for much erro-
neous judicial resolution of the party joinder issue. 36 Indeed, most courts 
appeared to have resolved the joinder question properly by correctly balancing 
the pertinent factors in classifying absentees as indispensable or necessary. 37 
But it was difficult to ascertain precisely how these satisfactory decisions had 
been made, "since the courts, in tune with the rule, had not asked the really 
cogent questions and hence failed to bring out the facts and their legal implica-
tions, by reference to which the results could be intelligently criticized."38 
Moreover, some judges had improperly resolved the joinder issue or used cate-
gorical, formulaic, or rigid approaches. 39 Thus, the rulemakers were concerned 
more with altering judicial reasoning processes than with case results40 or ex-
isting joinder principles.4t 
The amendment first designated entities that should be joined for just adju-
dication and required explicit consideration of the interests served by joinder.42 
When absentees were found to have an interest in the pending litigation-an 
interest that could be jeopardized by its resolution without them-or when the 
entities' absence could have injured parties to the case, courts were to determine 
whether joinder was feasible, considering subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and 
service of process.43 If joinder were feasible, judges were to order it.44 When 
joinder was infeasible, the rule provided guidance for determining whether in 
"equity and good conscience" the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed or proceed 
without the absentees.45 A list of factors implicating four pertinent interests 
informed this determination: (1) the plaintiff's need for a forum in which to 
litigate; (2) absentees' concern in minimizing prejudice to their interests if the 
case continued without them; (3) defendant's desire to avoid multiple actions, 
36. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 366-67. 
37. "A proper balancing of the values and interests could take place in the process of assigning 
persons to the categories mentioned, and no doubt this often occurred." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 
363. 
38. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367. 
39. "The existing rule, it was said ... had not resulted in any spate of wrong or hurtful deci-
sions. . • . But scholarly examination of the cases had turned up errors in no negligible quantity." 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 366-67. 
40. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12, 14-16, § 1608, at 92-93; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367. 
41. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12 (1968); 7 
c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12, 14-16. 
42. Amended rule 19 is reproduced in full supra note 2 and analyzed comprehensively infra 
text accompanying notes 124-255. Considerations pertinent to determining whether entities should 
be joined appear in subsections 19(a)(l), (a)(2) (i) and (ii). Judges and writers still employ the term 
"necessary." See, e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F. 2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986); 
F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 10.11, at 530 (3d ed. 1985). But "Rule 19's title 
phrase 'needed for [a] just adjudication' was substituted for 'necessary' in an effort to avoid the 
talismanic significance which that term had acquired." Freer, supra note 16, at 1076 n. 77. Thus, 
this Article avoids use of the term "necessary." 
43. These "joinder limitations" appear in the initial and concluding sentences of rule 19(a). See 
supra note 2 (full text of rule 19). 
44. The entity "shall be joined as a party in the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); see also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing rule 19(b)); 7 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1608 (discussing rule 19(b)). 
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inconsistent judgments, or sole responsibility for liability another should share; 
and (4) the public's interest in thorough, consistent, and efficient resolution of 
disputes.46 
The rulemakers emphasized the need to protect relevant interests, evincing 
particular solicitude for plaintiffs and absentees.47 The drafters also sought to 
encourage case-by-case, practical decisionmaking with a balancing of pertinent 
considerations when appropriate.48 In the 1968 case of Provident Tradesmens 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,49 the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on 
the amendment, approving the propositions above and giving the new rule its 
definitive judicial gloss. 
2. Public Rights Litigation 
About the time of the rule's amendment, there began to coalesce numerous 
closely related developments that altered significantly the character of much fed-
eral civil litigation. 50 These developments engendered a new party joinder prob-
lem that the rulemakers apparently did not anticipate.51 
One important development was the changed perception, and probably the 
reality, of much administrative decisionmaking.52 At the time of the New Deal 
and for several decades thereafter, numerous public officials and commentators 
46. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b). The characterization of the four factors in the text is drawn 
from the Supreme Court's formulation in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 
U.S. 102, 110-12 (1968). 
47. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-94; Provident Tradesmens Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968); Cohn, supra note 30, at 1210; see also infra text 
accompanying note 197 (discussing the relative import of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests). 
48. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-94; Provident Tradesmens, 390 
U.S. at 116-19. 
49. 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
50. Thorough analysis of all the developments is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this 
Article offers an account that examines themes most important to recognition of the public rights 
exception by drawing on numerous sources that have competently chronicled many of the develop-
ments. These sources include: CoUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LA w, BALANCING THE SCALES OF 
JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter BALANCING THE SCALES]; B. WEISBROD, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN 
EcONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW]; Rabin, 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1986) [hereinafter Rabin II]; 
Rabin, Lawyers/or Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976) 
[hereinafter Rabin I]; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667 (1975). 
51. Rule 19, its Advisory Committee's Note, and Professor Kaplan's writing evince no cogni-
zance of the problem. The rule seems to contemplate traditional two-party litigation, typified by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Provident Tradesmens. These considerations comport with many devel-
opments discussed below that were nascent when the amendment was adopted. Thus, although the 
exception appears to constitute a natural response to an unanticipated problem, rule 19's "liberaliza-
tion" may have obviated the need for the exception. Telephone interview with Professor Richard 
Marcus, University of Illinois, College of Law (July 18, 1986) (recognizing that Kaplan was propo-
nent of rules' "liberal ethos" favoring disposition of cases on merits); see also United States v. 
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (Rule 24 contemplated tradi-
tional private litigation); Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-66 ("The common law and early civil proce-
dure code rules were based essentially on a two-party model of litigation, a model that became 
obsolete in a more mobile and complex society."). 
52. Sees. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note l; J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 
(1978); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Gar-
land, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985); Rabin II, supra note 50, 
passim; Stewart, supra note 50, passim. 
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believed that the best agency decisions would result from trusting administrative 
expertise and that courts therefore should defer to agency expertise. 53 By the 
1960s, however, practical experience had undermined this New Deal faith and 
even created doubt about the possibility of objectively identifying the "public 
interest," which many agencies were commanded by statute to implement in 
their decisionmaking. 54 Furthermore, critics found that the exercise of adminis-
trative expertise alone did not guarantee the best substantive governmental deci-
skms. A number of ageney determinations required the balancing of numerous 
competing factors; some of these determinations involved policy choices such as 
wealth redistribution. Governmental decisions were affected by extra-agency in-
fluences, such as political pressure. Little of this decisionmaking, however, was 
amenable to resolution by "experts," so that judicial deference to agencies pre-
mised on expertise made less sense. 55 Commercial concerns, for example, con-
tended that agency decisionmaking was inaccurate, ineffective, and expensive; 
consumer organizations argued that agencies were biased toward industry. All 
these considerations contributed to the widespread perception that agencies had 
"failed" to accomplish the missions Congress assigned them. 56 
As a result of this new criticism, much administrative decisionmaking be-
53. New Deal Congresses delegated "sweeping powers to a host of new agencies under legisla-
tive directives cast in the most general terms," so that agencies had broad discretion to adjudicate 
and legislate. Stewart, supra note 50, at 1677. Defenders of this legislation justified broad discretion-
ary delegations, agencies' combination of functions, decreased procedural formalities, and deferential 
judicial review by arguing that the economy's salvation demanded administrative controls involving 
expertise, mixed powers, and discretionary management like that used by business. They also as-
serted that successful administration was "incompatible with legalistic formalities and [implicated] 
technical issues beyond the undertaking oflay judges." S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 
28; see Garland, supra note 52, at 577-78. 
54. In 1975 Professor Stewart stated: 
Experience has withered this faith. To the extent that belief in an objective "public inter-
est" remains, the agencies are accused of subverting it in favor of the private interests of 
regulated and client firms. [We] now doubt the very existence of an ascertainable "national 
welfare" as a meaningful guide to administrative decision. Exposure on the one hand to 
the complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and on the other to the corrosive 
seduction of welfare economics and pluralist political analysis, has sapped faith in the exist-
ence of an objective basis for social choice. 
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1682-83 (citations omitted); accord, Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1266-72, 
1281-1306. Section 307(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 307(a)(1970), instructs the 
Federal Communications Commission to grant licenses in the "public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity." Id. 
55. For example, the populace "lost faith in the notion that technical experts could obtain 
value-free results," Garland, supra note 52, at 577, or that they could protect the "public interest" 
against regulated interests, see Stewart, supra note 50, at 1682-83. 
56. For example, economists and some business representatives assert that regulatory programs 
characteristically benefit strategically placed, well-organized interests at the public's expense while 
the mechanisms administrators use to "alter market behavior-such as regulatory prohibitions, li-
censing, and other legalistic controls-are inappropriate, clumsy, and excessively costly." Corre-
spondingly, consumer advocates like Ralph Nader have criticized traditional regulatory agencies for 
being "captured" by the industries they ostensibly regulated and for failing to protect vigorously 
"consumers, workers, and other supposed beneficiaries of regulatory programs." S. BREYER & R. 
STEWART, supra note 1, at 36. For helpful analyses of changed perceptions of administrative deci-
sionmaking, see Garland, supra note 52, at 577-78; Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1186-90 (1973); Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1266-72, 1281-1306; Stewart, supra 
note 50, at 1671-88. 
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gan to be viewed as an essentially legislative process in which all interests57 af-
fected by agency judgments were considered and weighed in reaching the correct 
determination. 58 The difficulty with this perspective on the decisional process 
was that regulated entities submitted most of the input on which agencies relied 
in making decisions. Therefore, certain advocates of reform and critics of 
agency decisionmaking recommended the expansion of opportunities for 
nonindustry participation in administrative proceedings and courtroom litiga-
tion. Thus, judges eased constraints on citizen involvement in agency and judi-
cial proceedings. 59 Moreover, courts scrutinized administrative decisional 
processes to determine whether individuals and entities affected were adequately 
represented, whether agencies properly considered and balanced the ideas they 
expressed, and whether the conclusions reached were rational. 60 
The rise of this "interest representation" model of the administrative pro-
cess and judicial review of agency decisions was inextricably linked to the sub-
stantial expansion of the "public interest law movement."61 That movement, 
which originated in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties advocacy, sought 
to vindicate in the administrative sphere and in the courts rights and interests of 
large, unorganized groups of people, such as the poor, consumers, disadvantaged 
minorities, and others who previously had been underrepresented, if represented 
at all.62 
57. Interests considered particularly important were those previously unrepresented, such as 
consumers' interests. 
58. Professor Stewart has noted: 
Today, the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially legislative pro-
cess of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency pol-
icy. • . . Courts have asserted that agencies must consider all of the various interests 
affected by their decisions as an essential predicate to "balancing all elements essential to a 
just determination of the public interest." 
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1683 (citing Airline Pilots Ass'n, lnt'l v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973)). For helpful analyses of these new perspectives on administrative decisionmaking, see id. 
at 1711-59; Garland, supra note 52, at 577-81; Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1296-99. 
59. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-
06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); see also Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative 
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 362-69 (1972) (analyzing case law development easing constraints); 
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1723-56 (analyzing case law development easing contraints). 
60. The "model that emerged looked upon judicial review ... as a means of fostering a substi-
tute political process in which all affected interests would be represented and considered." Garland, 
supra note 52, at 578; see, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Airline Pilots Ass'n, lnt'I v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). For analyses of the model and the case law developing it, see 
Garland, supra note 52, at 577-81; Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1300-15; Stewart, supra note 50, at 
1756-60, 1781-89. 
61. See BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, passim; s. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPU-
LISTS, passim (1974); PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 50, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, at 224. 
Models are a matter of ongoing debate. See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Ration-
ality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, passim (1984); Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1311-15; Sunstein, Factions, 
Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271, 281-92 (1986). For help-
ful syntheses of these models, see Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363, passim 
(1986); Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1495-99 (1983). 
62. See BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, passim; PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 
50, passim; S. LAZARUS, supra note 61, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, passim; Stewart, supra note 
50, at 1711-16, 1748-70. For discussion of"public interest," or "public law," litigation, see Chayes, 
Public Law Litigation, supra note 1, passim; Chayes, Foreward, supra note 1, passim; Rabin I, supra 
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Closely related to these developments was much legislative activity.63 Be-
tween 1962 and 1980 Congress passed much "social legislation," said to institute 
"social regulation," in fields such as race, gender, and employment discrimina-
tion, and environmental, consumer, and workplace protection. 64 Many of the 
statutes vested considerable discretion in administrative agencies to implement 
broad mandates. But Congress also attempted to constrain exercise of that dis-
cretion. For example, legislation required agencies to solicit and consider public 
input and provided for administrative participation and citizen suits by the legis-
lation's intended beneficiaries. 65 
Thus, "public interest group" plaintiffs pursued an increasing share of fed-
eral civil litigation on behalf of substantial, unorganized collections of individu-
als to vindicate "public rights" allegedly violated by administrative 
decisionmakers.66 Moreover, some of these suits implicated amended rule 19 
concerns by proceeding in the absence of entities whose interests could have 
been adversely affected. In 1971 a new party joinder problem arose, when the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a national environmental "public 
interest group," sought to vindicate public rights under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). The NRDC sought to prevent the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) from buying coal under contracts with unjoined private produ-
cers until TVA satisfied NEPA's requirements. 
D. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority 
The pivotal opinion, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority (NRDC),67 harkens back to, and honors much in, National Licorice. 
note 50, at 228-35. For discussion of"early law reform efforts" and their links to modern efforts, see 
BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, at ch. 1; Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 
1438-43 (1984); Rabin I, supra note 50, at 209-24. 
63. See Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1278-95. Professor Rabin has criticized many writers for 
undifferentiated treatment of the activity, and he has offered analysis at once more thorough and 
refined. See Rabin I, supra note 50, at 242 (noting that much environmental legislation's passage 
was contemporaneous with the rise of public interest law). For discussion of "social regulation," see 
Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN 
PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL EssAYS 155 (T. Mccraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social 
Regulation," 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (Spring 1977). 
64. Classic examples of such legislation are: the National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 854 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35 (1977)); the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590-1620 (1970) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1985)); and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 
103-13 (1972) (codified at 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-e17 (1981)). Cf R. LITAN & w. NORDHAUS, RE-
FORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 44 (1983) (noting 40 major statutes that have been passed). 
65. Helpful examples of Congressional provision for administrative participation and citizen 
suits appear in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1712, & 1739 
(1986) and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1986). See also 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1973) 
(agency funding of citizen participation); Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolv-
ing the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982) (discussing agency funding of citizen participation in administrative 
proceedings). 
66. For discussion of this phenomenon and closely related developments, see sources cited 
supra notes 50 & 62; Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); see also Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1295-1315 (discussing specific litigation 
pursued by public interest group plaintiffs). 
67. 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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It also integrates numerous legal and policy developments, including changed 
perspectives on administrative decisiorunaking, that occurred during the inter-
vening period. 68 Most significant, however, NRDC provided a foundation for 
creation of the public rights exception. 
In NRDC the Natural Resources Defense Council sought to compel TVA's 
compliance with the dictates of NEPA before the agency purchased coal under 
contracts with private producers. These producers were not sued because it was 
impossible to serve them. NRDC alleged that NEPA required TVA to prepare 
an environmental impact statement on the envirorunental consequences of buy-
ing strip-mined coal to be burned in the agency's power plants. The governmen-
tal defendant, TVA, asked that NRDC's case be dismissed for failure to join as 
"indispensable parties" the private producers who had contracted to sell the 
agency coal. The court refused to require joinder, partly because NRDC was 
vindicating statutorily provided public rights, independent of any private con-
tractual interests that the producers were free to pursue: 
The instant action, like that in National Licorice, seeks to enforce 
an essentially public right . . . . 
Plaintiffs do not seek to abrogate the contracts, but to restrain 
defendants from purchasing coal under them "until such time as the 
requirements of the National Envirorunental Policy Act of 1969 are 
met." If this relief were granted, the private contractors would still be 
able to assert their rights against TVA .... 69 
Thus, NRDC is similar to National Licorice. Both courts would have permitted 
plaintiffs to vindicate public rights without joining absentees that had private 
contractual interests separate from those rights-interests that the absentees re-
mained free to pursue. NRDC, however, differs in certain respects from Na-
tional Licorice: the NRDC court allowed a "public interest group" to vindicate 
public rights in new "social legislation" against a government agency. The 
NRDC court also employed an amended rule 19(b) analysis that explicitly 
treated National Licorice under only the subdivision's first stated factor: the 
extent of prejudice to absentees if the litigation proceeds without them. 70 These 
distinctions, although technical, were predictable. For example, the "party 
transformation"-which permitted an essentially private entity to serve as the 
plaintiff for vindicating public rights against a government defendant, rather 
than allowing the government to pursue public rights against private parties-
comported with numerous earlier developments, such as liberalized standing ac-
corded public interest groups.71 Correspondingly, the emphasis on rule 19 was 
compelled by its 1966 revision.72 Nevertheless, theNRDC court, by "moderniz-
68. For discussion of these developments, see supra text accompanying notes 50-66. 
69. NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 408 (quoting the complaint). 
70. Id. at 407-08. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 59; see also NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 408 (citing landmark 
standing and environmental cases); Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 23, at 963·69 (suggesting 
that private entities might vindicate public rights). 
72. The NRDC court could not ignore rule 19. Judges who recognize the public rights excep-
tion, however, arguably are ignoring rule 19 and, thus, raise the question whether they can create 
true exceptions to the Federal Rules. See a/so Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) 
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ing" National Licorice and mentioning the public nature of the rights being as-
serted, afforded additional support for recognition of the public rights exception. 
In sum, neither National Licorice nor NRDC expressly espoused a "public 
rights exception" to party joinder. The independent character of the rights 
under consideration and fidelity to applicable party joinder concepts, whether 
grounded in common law, equity, or the applicable Federal Rule, were signifi-
cant for both decisions. 73 
It is on these points, however, that judges subsequently broke with these 
two prior cases, notwithstanding liberal citation to them, and created the "pub-
lic rights exception."·74 Thus, although numerous federal courts have seized on 
National Licorice and NRDC to support recognition of a public rights exception, 
this reliance seems misplaced. Furthermore, none of these courts has clearly 
enunciated, assessed, or justified the exception. It is important, therefore, to 
analyze the public rights exception as articulated; this analysis will enhance un-
derstanding of problems the exception engenders and the party joinder issue it 
addresses. This evaluation will also suggest approaches for treating that 
question. 
II. JUDICIAL ARTICULATION OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
A. Description of the Cases 
Ten district court judges have explicitly recognized the "public rights ex-
ception. " 75 As might be expected, seven sit either in the District of Columbia or 
the Ninth Circuit; most federal agencies "reside" in the District of Columbia, 
and much public land is located in the Ninth Circuit. Although neither circuit 
has expressly applied the public rights exception, both are currently considering 
recognition, and the Second and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly applied it.76 
(federal judiciary must follow unambiguous requirements of federal rules). For helpful discussion of 
the rules' purpose, construction, status and validity, rulemaking authority, and the weight of Advi-
sory Committee recommendations, see 4 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL §§ 1029-30 (1969); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1601, at 13. 
73. See National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 362-67; NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 407-08. 
74. Judges enunciated this exception in most cases decided in the 1970s and in a number of 
cases since then. These cases are cited infra notes 75-76 and analyzed infra text accompanying notes 
77-123. 
75. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613-14 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal 
filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85-009 
Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Sierra Club 
v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. 
La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied., 106 S. Ct. 1259 
(1986); NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D.D.C. 1982); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 
1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); NRDC v. Berk-
lund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), ajf'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); 
National Audubon Soc'y v. Kleppe, C.A. No. 76-0943, at 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1976), modified on 
other grounds, National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sansom Comm. v. 
Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
76. The District of Columbia Circuit case is National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 
1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); while the 
Ninth Circuit case is Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-
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Litigation in this area has implicated a variety of rights and issues. Na-
tional public interest organizations, concerned with protection and preservation 
of natural resources, have brought four cases against the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior asserting public rights under public lands legislation or 
NEPA. The successful vindication of public rights in these suits could have 
prejudiced absentees by adversely affecting some interest, such as leaseholds, 
that the absentees claimed in the public lands.77 In similar litigation the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union challenged on first amendment grounds Interior De-
partment issuance to a religious organization of a permit for use of public 
lands. 78 Three suits sought to compel compliance with the requirements of 
NEPA when the Interior Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed to undertake "major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."79 
Two cases questioned the constitutionality of tenant eviction procedures, 80 and 
two others involved employment issues affecting farm workers and correctional 
officers. 81 
An important problem with judicial articulation of the public rights excep-
tion is that the courts have applied it in varied factual circumstances that are 
difficult to generalize. Moreover, courts have invoked the exception in the con-
text of a federal rule that is very difficult to apply and they have failed to explain 
clearly the exception's relationship to that rule. In the basic scenario a "public 
3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986). Many judges cite the circuit court opinion in NRDC v. Berk-
lund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979), as affirming the holding in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 
925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), but the exception is not expressly mentioned in the circuit court opinion. 
The Second and Eleventh Circuit cases are Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 
520 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976), and Jeffries v. Georgia Residen-
tial Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982). In a recent case 
the District of Columbia District Court's "review of the interests identified by Rule 19(b)" led to the 
conclusion absentees were not indispensable, so that it "need not determine whether [the case fell] 
within the 'public rights' exception." Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 
1387 & n.4 (D.D.C. 1986). The Author also found no decision rejecting the exception, although this 
is not surprising, given the many ways to avoid it. But a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, reviewing a trial court's decision that "the 'public interest' exception to Rule 19 applied," 
stated it could "affirm on any basis supported in the record" and concluded that the absentees did 
"not satisfy the requirements for a 'necessary party' under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)." Northern Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986). Some judges appear to apply, but do not 
explicitly mention, the exception. See, e.g., Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Ap-
prenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448 (D.D.C. 1978); Delaware v. Bender, 370 F. Supp. 
1193 (D. Del. 1974). 
77. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); National Wild-
life Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on 
rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berk-
lund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
78. See Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981). 
79. See Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 158 F.2d 
1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 
1271 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The quoted phrase in the text is NEPA's language that requires preparation 
of an environmental impact statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
80. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 971 (1982); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
81. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1982). 
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interest litigant" sues a governmental defendant challenging agency activity but 
fails to join absentees whose interests could be adversely affected by a substan-
tive judicial determination favorable to the plaintiff. The court, presented with a 
potential party joinder problem, has applied the public rights exception, al-
lowing the plaintiff's case to proceed without requiring joinder of absentees. 
This difficulty has arisen in diverse factual contexts, although a taxonomy of 
situations can be described in terms of rule 19's steps. 
In a few cases absentees apparently have lacked sufficient interest in the 
litigation to warrant designation as parties needed for just adjudication under 
rule 19(a).82 For instance, applicants seeking governmental permission to ex-
plore for natural resources on public lands have been held to lack adequate inter-
est in the continued application of approval procedures that public interest 
litigants alleged violated NEPA. 83 Of course, if absentee interest were insuffi-
cient, that determination would have obviated the necessity to reach the ancil-
lary question whether disposition of the litigation without an absentee might "as 
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect" such an interest. 84 
Although courts have not expressly depended on lack of potential absentee prej-
udice when cases proceeded without absentees, such reliance may have been ap-
propriate when absentee interests were not sufficiently affected. 85 
In some circumstances absentees apparently possessed enough interest in 
the litigation to be considered entities needed for just adjudication. Moreover, 
absentee joinder appeared feasible under rule 19(a)'s joinder limitations, pertain-
ing to subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process, principally be-
cause the absentees were located within the jurisdiction. 86 For example, when a 
citizens' organization sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania to compel Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment compliance with two federal statutes before approving a development ap-
plication, it seemed feasible to join the University of Pennsylvania, which would 
82. Rule 19(a) requires that an absentee have an "interest relating to the subject of the action 
and [be] so situated" that disposition without the absentee would practically prejudice that interest 
or expose parties to a "substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obli-
gations." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
83. "The 'subject matter' of this dispute concerns NPS procedures regarding mining plan ap-
proval. Naturally, all miners are 'interested' in how stringent the requirements will be. But miners 
with pending plans have no legal entitlement to any given set of procedures." Northern Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 
305, 321-24 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (owners of mineral rights have no legally protected interest in dispute 
questioning Interior Secretary's decision to remove land from wilderness inventory). This premise 
also may have been true of absentees in other cases, such as certain absentee landlords in Jeffries v. 
Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982), and 
Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981), who may have lacked sufficient interest in the 
continued applicability of tenant eviction procedures challenged as unconstitutional. 
84. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(i). "If the interest requirement is not satisfied, we need not reach 
the factors in clauses (2)(i) and (ii) [of rule 19(a)]." Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 
F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986). 
85. In these situations, absentees had sufficient interest but were insufficiently prejudiced. 
86. The rule states that a "person who is subject to service of process and whosejoinder will not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action" or render venue improper 
"shall be joined as a party in the action." FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). 
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have been adversely affected were plaintiff's request granted. 87 Similarly, when 
the Sierra Club challenged in the United States District Court for Alaska the 
stringency of Interior Department procedures governing issuance of permits to 
work claims on Alaskan national parks, it appeared feasible to join miners who 
held such permits. 88 Despite rule 19(a)'s language, which says judges shall or-
der joinder when feasible, the judges in these cases did not order joinder. Per-
haps they believed that it would have been unduly expensive for the plaintiff to 
identify and serve all absentees, that the plaintiff's relief would have been jeop-
ardized by the resulting delay, or that the presence of absentees would have 
complicated the litigation. 89 
In the remaining cases joinder apparently was infeasible, as the large 
number and wide geographic distribution of absentees meant all the rule 19(a) 
joinder limitations could not be satisfied. In those situations, judges seemed to 
determine, pursuant to rule 19(b)'s "equity and good conscience" test and its 
four stated factors, that it was fairer to allow the plaintiff's suit to continue 
rather than to dismiss it.90 Moreover, in a few instances courts apparently failed 
to consider seriously options less drastic than continuing or dismissing, such as 
notifying absentees and affording them an opportunity to enter the litigation.91 
It is important to understand, however, that judges responded identically in 
87. See Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
88. These were the miners who had approved plans and were not joined in Nothem Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), rather than those with 
applications for plans whose joinder was at issue in the circuit court case, Northern Alaska Envtl. 
Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986). It also appears from the facts stated in the 
opinions that joinder of absentees was feasible in numerous other cases in which courts applied the 
exception. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 971 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated 
on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Dintino v. 
Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981). 
89. One court offered the most explicit statement of these concerns: 
Because of problems of jurisdiction and venue, plaintiff could never join all defendants in 
one forum. Requiring it to bring seventeen separate lawsuits or even to combine actions 
through the device of multidistrict litigation would create enormous administrative disor-
der and delay. Dismissal, therefore, would effectively discourage and, for all practical pur-
poses, put an end to this litigation. 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), 
a.ff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-
5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1387-
89 (D.D.C. 1986) (expressing similar concerns). 
90. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 
458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), a.ff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on 
re/tearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
91. Very few of the opinions in which courts recognized the exception specifically indicate that 
such options were considered. See, e.g., NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1982); 
Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981). Because the facts and reasoning processes are 
unclear in the cases, see infra note 94, the opinions cannot be definitively classified. Thus, some 
appear above in multiple categories. Moreover, the joinder question arises in a few cases out of 
unusual fact situations. For example, in one case, the federal government defendant moved to dis-
miss a case brought by the state for failure to join certain state agencies. See Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. 
Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. 1259 (1986). 
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all of these factual circumstances; they invoked the public rights exception so 
that the plaintiff's action could proceed. But very few courts explained the rela-
tionship between the exception and rule 19, or clearly and comprehensively ap-
plied that rule's requirements. Some judges even appeared to disregard rule 19's 
express commands.92 In a number of situations courts might have resolved the 
joinder question correctly under rule 19, and in other instances absentees' inter-
ests ultimately were protected because they entered the case or were adequately 
represented by the government.93 In some circumstances, however, the joinder 
issue may have been improperly resolved. In a number of additional situations it 
is impossible to determine conclusively what courts actually did.94 
In short, judicial reliance on the public rights exception to address the diffi-
cult party joinder question presented by public rights litigation has been prob-
lematic. Courts' enunciation of that exception is analyzed more 
comprehensively below. 
B. Analysis of the Cases 
A few judges recognizing the public rights exception have thoroughly ex-
plored the difficult issues involved.95 But some courts have treated the exception 
so tersely or unclearly that its basis cannot be definitively ascertained. Nonethe-
less, it is possible to discern three principal ways in which the exception has been 
articulated: a few judges have announced it with minimal explication; some 
have relied on considerations of public policy; and others have somehow invoked 
rule 19. Courts that have enunciated the exception in the second and third ways 
frequently intertwined the explanations provided.96 
92. The best example is failure to order joinder of absentees when feasible as explicitly man-
dated by the rule. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
93. Of course, absentee entry may have been very inconvenient. Moreover, adequate represen-
tation of their interests by the government may have been merely fortuitous, given certain peculiari-
ties of public rights litigation such as disparities between absentee and governmental interests. See 
infra text accompanying notes 158-59. 
94. This classification, tailored to rule 19, is only one of numerous ways to categorize the di-
verse factual contexts in which courts have invoked the public rights exception. Furthermore, it is 
often difficult to determine all the relevant facts from terse opinions and meaningfully explain a 
complex, multi-faceted procedural issue. Nonetheless, several important considerations warrant 
mention. It is important to consider the players, their interests and motivations, and how deserving 
their conduct is. For example, has the plaintiff failed to join absentees due to a lack of awareness of 
them, because they would strategically disadvantage the plaintiff, or because their joinder would be 
very expensive? Have absentees failed to enter the litigation because they were not notified, for 
tactical reasons, or because they were distant from the forum? Another significant consideration 
could be timing: who knew what, when did they know it, and how did they respond to the informa-
tion? A third important consideration may be the options available. Were the only choices dismissal 
of the plaintiff's case or proceeding without absentees? Were there less extreme possibilities, such as 
the plaintiff suing in another forum or absentees entering the litigation? If there were other options, 
how costly would they have been? All of these and other considerations are examined fully, infra 
notes 124-255 and accompanying text. 
95. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, 
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
96. Examples are cases cited infra notes 100-22. Insofar as possible, analysis of the first and 
second ways of articulating the exception is separated from rule 19. Courts apparently had little 
difficulty with this separation, but it is problematic, because the exception should have no existence 
apart from rule 19. 
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1. The Essentially Unadorned Exception 
A few judges simply have proclaimed with little explanation that the excep-
tion exists,97 apparently considering rule 19 inapplicable to public rights litiga-
tion. One court found irrelevant the "effect that a judgment may have on third 
parties [because] the constraints of Rule 19 apply only to adjudications of 'pri-
vate rights.' "98 A second court stated, "[E]ven when a party might otherwise 
be indispensable, joinder is not required where the plaintiff seeks to vindicate 
public rights."99 
2. Public Policy Considerations 
A number of courts recognizing the public rights exception have relied on 
concepts of public policy. These courts recognize that public rights litigation, 
which challenges governmental activity involving constitutional, statutory, or 
administrative issues, can affect many geographically dispersed entities, thereby 
rendering joinder impracticable, if not impossible. 100 From these considerations 
the courts reason that adherence to rule 19 could effectively preclude public 
rights suits by making such claims unduly cumbersome or by denying the plain-
tiff a forum. 101 
Numerous unstated assumptions apparently underlie these ideas. One may 
be that litigation questioning governmental activity is intrinsically beneficial, 
partly because it could increase public accountability of government officials for 
their actions or it could make such activity more acceptable to the citizenry.102 
Similarly, judges apparently assume that it is important to afford plaintiffs a 
"day in court" and to resolve on the merits the significant issues raised, rather 
97. The opinions of these judges, and others, also include conclusory propositions. For exam-
ple, one court stated that "NEPA suits have rarely included the joinder of all parties which hold 
contracts, licenses, leases or other rights which might be affected." National Audubon Soc'y v. 
Kleppe, C.A. No. 76-0943, at 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1976), modified on other grounds, National Audu-
bon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
98. Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d 
1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986). 
99. Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981). These cases, and others, do cite 
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940), and later cases recognizing the exception. See, 
e.g., Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 
No. J 85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985). But the precedent does not support the proposi-
tions for which it is invoked. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29, 67-74. 
100. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berk-
lund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1614 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.). 
101. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 
458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1614 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.). 
102. For example, in recent public rights litigation involving government accountability, the Na-
tional Park Service "confessed to NEPA violations" and was "violating its own regulations concern-
ing access to claims" when it permitted mining in Alaska's national parks. See Northern Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986). For discussions of public accountability 
for, and acceptability of, governmental decisions, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broad-
e11ed Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Furrow, Governing 
Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983); Sunstein, 
Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 986-88 (1982). 
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than to dismiss potentially legitimate suits.103 Such dismissal in turn could 
shield from public scrutiny improper governmental behavior, like violation of 
statutory commands governing disposition of the public lands, and permit ab-
sentees to benefit from the improper conduct.104 Moreover, judges seem to ap-
preciate certain practicalities of public rights litigation in the modern 
administrative state. For instance, "public interest group" plaintiffs have avail-
able minimal resources for litigation, especially in contrast to governmental de-
fendants and certain interests subject to governmental regulation.1u5 Thus, were 
a court to order dismissal of such a public interest litigant's case against the 
government and offer the possibility of relitigation in an alternative forum, that 
public interest litigant could well be disproportionately affected by the delay, 
expense, and effort entailed in pursuing the option. 106 
Most of these public policy considerations, however, effectuate or implicate 
concerns addressed by rule 19, especially solicitude for plaintiffs having a forum. 
Other courts have articulated the exception by relying more directly on the rule. 
3. Invocation of Rule 19 
Courts enunciating the exception in terms of rule 19 seem to invoke one or 
more of its components. Much judicial treatment is less clear than it might be. 
Courts do not expressly examine every consideration relevant to the rule or fol-
low all of its steps, apparently making assumptions about those left unmentioned 
or perhaps even ignoring them. For example, when absentees are located in the 
jurisdiction, so that their joinder appears feasible under rule 19(a)'s joinder limi-
tations, judges do not specifically explore the possibility of that joinder. When 
courts explicitly apply pertinent considerations, judges fail to explain clearly 
why or how the factors pertain. For instance, courts treat plaintiffs' need for a 
forum in which to pursue public rights litigation as so important that it is virtu-
ally impossible for absentees' interests to be prejudiced in any way that could be 
103. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. 
Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiarn); National Wildlife Fed'n 
v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.). The courts thus are implement-
ing the Federal Rules' "liberal ethos" favoring disposition of cases on the merits. See supra note 51. 
104. For example, had the district court in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85-
009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), dismissed the Sierra Club's case, the NPS' violations of 
NEPA and its own regulations governing mining in the national parks would not have been exposed 
or remedied, while the miners would have continued to benefit from the less rigorous environmental 
regulation afforded by the improper NPS conduct. See also supra note 27 (noting the National 
Licorice Court's apparent appreciation of the absurdity of permitting statutory violators to elude the 
law by seeking dismissal premised on failure to join absentee statutory beneficiaries). 
105. See, e.g., PRACTICING LAW INsr., CoURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" Lm-
GATION chs. 7, 23 (1978) (discussing public rights litigation costs); BALANCING THE SCALES, supra 
note 50, at ch. 4; PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 50, at chs. 4, 18 (discussing plaintiffs' re-
sources). See generally Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (discussing private litigation costs). 
106. The judges who decided Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 
1386-88 (D.D.C. 1986), and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1609, 
1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), evinced awareness of these and similar realities of public rights litiga-
tion. For discussions of additional realities of public rights litigation, see PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, 
supra note 50, passim; Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 1, passim; Chayes, Foreword, supra 
note l, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, passim. 
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considered more significant under rule 19(b ). 107 
The best illustration of such unclear judicial articulation of the exception is 
courts' reliance on National Licorice Co. v. NLRB 108 for the proposition that 
" 'when litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third persons who 
could be adversely affected by a decision favorable to [the] plaintiff do not 
thereby become indispensable parties.' " 109 As already discussed, National Lico-
rice does not actually support this idea. 110 That decision did not rely so strongly 
on the public nature of the rights in question or de-emphasize absentee 
interests. 111 
Even if National Licorice could be read to substantiate that proposition, 
reliance on the opinion and the proposition is problematic. Judges essentially 
substitute citation to a 1940 case for the comprehensive inquiry envisioned by 
the 1966 amendment to rule 19. Courts should consult relevant considerations 
and explain clearly judicial determinations even if they do not provide express 
step-by-step explication of their treatment in opinions.112 Rule 19 instructs 
courts to find initially whether absentees have the type of interest in the litiga-
tion to be considered parties needed for just adjudication under rule 19(a). If 
absentees are needed, judges then must determine whether joinder is feasible 
pursuant to rule 19(a)'s joinder limitations respecting subject matter jurisdiction, 
venue, and service of process. If these requirements are satisfied, courts are 
commanded to order absentee joinder. When absentee joinder is found infeasi-
ble, judges must next find under rule 19(b) whether it is more equitable for the 
plaintiff's action to continue or to be dismissed. This subdivision contemplates 
that courts will examine first its four stated factors, especially those implicating 
the plaintiff's forum needs and potential absentee prejudice, then examine addi-
tional pertinent considerations, and perhaps value and balance all the relevant 
factors. Judges should also consider options less Draconian than dismissing the 
plaintiff's case or proceeding without absentees, if alternatives are available. 
Only after making this detailed inquiry should courts determine whether it is 
more fair for the plaintiff's litigation to be dismissed or to continue. Dismissal is 
107. Indeed, Professor Freer recently observed that "[t]hough this is but one factor in a mul-
tifactor balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to primary importance by their reluctance to 
dismiss in the absence of an adequate alternative forum." Freer, supra note 16, at 1078. Rule 19 can 
be difficult to apply. See infra text accompanying note 123. But little judicial treatment of the rule, 
especially in relationship to the exception, is as clear as it might be. 
108. 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
109. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Jeffries v. Georgia 
Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982)). This proposition, derived from National 
Licorice, is found in the first case applying the exception, Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 
1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and in half of the opinions issued between Sierra Club and Sansom 
Comm. Reliance on this proposition with little more is not the only example of unclear judicial 
articulation of the exception. But this is the best example, because it is so ubiquitous, both in the 
sense of being widespread and because it illustrates numerous difficulties in judicial enunciation of 
the exception in terms of rule 19. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29. 
111. Indeed, abiding solicitude for absentees is fundamental to National Licorice. See supra text 
accompanying notes 26-27. 
112. In some situations, when a fair solution is readily available, the inquiry can be less thor-
ough. Even then, however, judges should clearly explain the resolution reached. 
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to be premised on a judgment that absentees are "indispensable," while continu-
ing is to be based on the decision that absentees are not indispensable. But both 
determinations are conclusory ones meant to attach only at the very end of the 
process described. 113 The drafters who amended rule 19(b) a quarter century 
after National Licorice was decided, and the Supreme Court Justices applying 
the new version two years later, expressly admonished judges to determine 
whether absentees are indispensable only after treating relevant considera-
tions.114 Forinstance, Justice Harlan emphasized that saying a "court 'must' 
dismiss in the absence of an indispensable party ... puts the matter the wrong 
way around: a court does not know whether a particular person is 'indispensa-
ble' until it has examined the situation to determine whether it can proceed with-
out him."115 
By depending on the proposition derived from National Licorice with little 
more, judges have failed to articulate explicitly the factors that comprise their 
determinations. As a result, readers cannot discern whether courts properly re-
solved the joinder question or even if they correctly performed the rule 19 in-
quiry.116 Most important, it is difficult to determine whether courts were 
sufficiently solicitous of absentees. Judges have often failed to mention absentee 
prejudice expressly, and in several recent public rights cases absentees were suffi-
ciently injured to contest trial judges' decisions not to require absentee join-
der.117 In one case absentees had spent millions of dollars exploring for natural 
resources on public lands in reliance on agency representations that it was 
proper to do so. These investments allegedly would be lost should the appeal be 
rejected, as adequate relief cannot be secured from the government under pres-
ent compensation systems.118 
Perhaps reliance on the idea drawn from National Licorice to the exclusion 
113. For a detailed analysis of the rule 19 inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 124-255. 
114. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118-19 n.15 
(1968); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93. 
115. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 119. 
116. The reasoning processes can be determined only by scrutinizing the facts or supplying miss· 
ing particulars, such as the number and geographic location of absentees, the nature of their interests 
and possible prejudice of proceeding without absentees as well as the location of an alternative forum 
where plaintiff could sue and the relative convenience of pursuing that option. See also K. LLEWEL· 
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38 (1960) (late nineteenth century judiciary's "guerrilla raids 
on statutes by way of 'strict construction' " made every statutory case a faro game); supra note 13 
and accompanying text (similar characterization of difficulties entailed in understanding Shields v. 
Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855)). 
117. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Conner v. 
Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 
1986); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), 
ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
118. The case is National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, 
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). However, Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) and Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 
85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986) are similar cases. Telephone interview with Constance 
Brooks, Vice-President and General Counsel of the Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), 
Intervenor in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford and Conner v. Burford (June 19, 1986) (alleging that 
investment will be lost and noting that the other two cases are similar). 
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of nearly all else constitutes a cryptic formulation of the inquiry rule 19 contem-
plates. Courts may have considered absentee interest and potential prejudice, 
and joinder's feasibility under rule 19(a); they may also have analyzed absentee 
prejudice and plaintiffs' forum needs, valued these and other relevant factors, 
and balanced them when appropriate under rule 19(b).119 For instance, a review 
of some opinions in which judges depended on the proposition drawn from Na-
tional Licorice with little more reveals that absentees seemed to have the requi-
site interest and their joinder appeared infeasible. 12° Concomitantly, prejudice 
to absentees of proceeding apparently could have been kept minimal. Moreover, 
plaintiffs may have had difficulty securing relief were dismissal ordered, because 
no alternative forum was available in state court and even were there a forum at 
the federal level its invocation would have been inconvenient. In those particu-
lar situations plaintiffs' needs were paramount and judges resolved the joinder 
question properly by permitting the case to continue without requiring absentee 
joinder. 121 However, these courts should have explained the considerations they 
examined and how those factors yielded the determination that it was appropri-
ate to continue. Instead, the judges, like courts in half of the cases recognizing 
the public rights exception, relied almost exclusively on the uninformative prop-
osition that " 'when litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third per-
sons who may be adversely affected by a decision favorable to the plaintiff do not 
thereby become indispensable parties.' "122 
In sum, although a dozen federal courts have recognized a public rights 
exception, none has clearly enunciated it, and some treatment has been strained 
or unexplained. Moreover, few judges have expressly exhibited regard for rele-
vant interests other than those of plaintiffs, even for absentees threatened with 
substantial loss-interests rule 19 requires be considered. In fairness, all of the 
courts were addressing a difficult question of party joinder that appeared to have 
no simple solution and whose proper resolution might have seemed to mandate 
dismissal of sympathetic plaintiffs' public rights cases. Judges had to apply a 
119. This list is neither exhaustive nor universally applicable. For a suggested analysis, meant to 
provide an example of the type of comprehensive inquiry that rule 19 contemplates in certain cases, 
see infra text accompanying notes 124-255. See also infra note 133 (discussing the possibility of 
streamlined analysis). 
120. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. 
Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981). 
121. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 319-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Swomley v. Watt, 
526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981); see also infra note 203 (noting that no state forum is avail-
able when plaintiffs challenge federal activity). 
122. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Jeffries v. Georgia 
Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (11th Cir. 1982)). Ironically, the public rights exception 
when so viewed resurrects the very deficiencies in the 1938 rule and its attendant application that 
necessitated the 1966 amendment. The sloganeering, jurisprudence of labels, and failure to consider 
relevant interests and explain determinations that the rulemakers meant to remedy, see supra text 
accompanying notes 30-48, are merely revisited with invocation of the "public interest"-even could 
one overcome the difficulties of defining that elastic concept and ascertaining who should represent 
it. These difficulties are nicely illustrated by the rise of entities like MSLF that represent interests 
like those of lessees. For discussions of the "public interest," see G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST (1962); Gellhom, supra note 59, at 360. Indeed, the cases read as a group leave the impres-
sion that there is an exception to each of rule 19's three principal components: 19(a), the joinder 
requirements, and 19(b). 
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federal rule that essentially enjoined them to "do equity" by examining several 
difficult-to-evaluate, conflicting considerations, while accommodating the devel-
oping concept of public rights litigation.123 
Given these constraints, the exception afforded a workable, albeit problem-
atic solution. The difficulties with these cases lie primarily in what courts omit-
ted, assumed, or stated unclearly. These problems do not necessarily mean that 
judges resolved the joinder issue erroneously. Indeed, a number of courts appar-
ent1y made correct decisions and certainly effectuated rule 19's weighty concern 
for plaintiffs' forum needs. However, the reader of judicial opinions invoking 
the public rights exception cannot positively determine if most of the courtS 
reached appropriate conclusions. Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain 
whether judges followed the rule's steps in resolving the joinder question, and a 
few judges apparently ignored or even violated the rule's explicit commands. 
Indeed, it is impossible to discern what some judges applying the exception in 
fact did. Regardless of whether these joinder issues were properly concluded, 
the unclear judicial treatment has protracted litigation and wasted resources and 
may have eroded respect for the judiciary. 
Although courts have not clearly articulated the public rights exception, 
they generally have seemed able to resolve the joinder issue correctly. This sug-
gests that the public rights exception is not needed. Perhaps the most provoca-
tive question the cases raise is whether judges could have solved the pertinent 
joinder problem, without the complications accompanying the exception's appli-
cation, by employing rule 19 and additional available mechanisms, especially 
those in other federal rules and the United States Code. Thus, although the 
public rights exception has been invoked more frequently during the 1980s, the 
exception cannot be enunciated satisfactorily, and its application seems unwar-
ranted. Because public rights litigation is increasing substantially, the federal 
judiciary should encounter the party joinder question even more frequently. It is 
important, therefore, to determine whether the party joinder issue can be treated 
more appropriately under rule 19 and additional existing measures. 
III. A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the cases indicates that some courts created the public rights 
exception because they believed that application of rule 19 effectively would end 
public rights litigation. Correspondingly, few judges expressly evinced regard 
for relevant interests other than those of plaintiffs. As discussed later, however, 
concerns about rule 19's application to public rights litigation were unfounded 
and the apparent lack of solicitude for additional interests was inappropriate. 
The nature of public rights litigation and of the rule 19 inquiry means that 
judges can facilitate plaintiffs' vindication of public rights and better accommo-
date other interests. Thus, it is important to explore how courts might apply the 
rule to the joinder problem. This Article provides both general guidance and a 
123. Judges may have believed that rule 19 contemplated polycentric decisionmaking. See 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. R.Ev. 353, 394-404 (1978). 
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specific assessment that principally entails rule 19 analysis, integrated with non-
rule 19 elements, when proper. 124 The entire examination is tailored to the real-
ities of public rights litigation, with pertinent illustrations drawn from the case 
law, and relies on rule 19's phraseology as well as pronouncements of the 
rulemakers and judges applying the rule and the public rights exception.125 
A. General Guidance 
A court may consider the party joinder question posed by public rights 
litigation on its own motion 126 or that of the defendant, who generally bears the 
124. It is helpful to view the 1966 party joinder amendments as a package of different tools 
designed to solve similar problems. Thus, this Article focuses on rule 19, augmenting the discussion 
with FED. R. C1v. P. 23 (class actions) and FED. R. C1v. P. 24 (intervention), whenever those rules 
facilitate analysis. For similar approaches, see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 
824-29 (5th Cir. 1967); Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88 
(D.D.C. 1986); McCoid, A Single Package For Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707 (1976). 
The rulemakers also accorded interrelated treatment to the three rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 109 (1966) [hereinafter Rule 24 Advisory Comm. Note]; Kaplan, 
supra note 5. It is also important to be aware that the joinder difficulty posed by public rights 
litigation can present problems different from those typically raised by more traditional private law 
litigation. For instance, the government has less incentive to notify the court of absentees' existence 
or to notify the absentees than do defendants in more traditional suits, because the government will 
not be liable to absentees under existing compensation schemes. See also Freer, supra note 16 (dis-
cussing joinder problems raised by traditional litigation). By offering a rule 19 solution to this join-
der difficulty, this Article is not necessarily endorsing the rule. It merely suggests that the exception 
is problematic, while rule 19 affords a workable, if less than optimal, solution to the particular 
difficulty. Professor Freer recently has offered valuable suggestions for restructuring rule 19 in the 
context of traditional private law litigation, although he explicitly excluded public rights litigation 
from his consideration. See Freer, supra note 16, at 1063 n.31, 1097-1110. These recommendations 
warrant serious consideration, but seem unlikely to be adopted in the near future. Moreover, if the 
suggestions were adopted, the applicability of certain ones to public law litigation may be problem-
atic. Nonetheless, a number of them apply to public rights litigation and are included in later analy-
sis. Professor Freer's ideas regarding rule 19(c), which requires the plaintiff to notify the court of 
absentees, are illustrative. Freer, supra note 16, at 1085-88. Thus, although his advocacy of more 
rigorous judicial enforcement of the notification requirement is appropriate, his suggestion that 
courts impose sanctions against violators may be inadvisable in public rights litigation. See infra 
notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
125. Rule 19 Advisory Committee Note is a convenient source for the rule and rulemaker pro-
nouncements, although the reader may wish to consult the rule's text, which is reproduced in full 
supra note 2, in considering the later analysis. It may seem curious to rely on cases recognizing the 
exception, given the criticisms above, but many of the cases inform the later analysis. See National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) (example 
of helpful rule 19 analysis; problematic invocation of exception). 
The guidance provided by the later analysis is less full and general than it might be, because the 
author had to make choices about depth, detail, and relevance. It also is not dispositive, because 
every situation cannot be anticipated. Even could more precise advice be afforded, it seems inadvisa-
ble, as judges should be free to tailor analysis to the specific circumstances they confront. But the 
guidance offered should enable courts to apply rule 19 efficaciously to most situations in which they 
must treat the joinder question raised by public rights suits. When other approaches appear prefera-
ble, they should be employed. 
As generally used here, "interest" means stake and "consideration" means element to be 
treated. But each also may have more specific connotations in the later analysis. Interest may mean 
what is needed to satisfy rule 19(a)'s criteria, like a mineral lease of public lands. See infra text 
accompanying notes 144-77. Moreover, it was employed in Provident Tradesmens to facilitate treat-
ment of rule 19(b)'s four stated factors. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 
U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). Interest as so used and the rule 19(b) factors will be described generically 
as considerations. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 181-97. 
126. See McCowen v. Jamieson, 724 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. 
Supp. 305, 320 (E.D. Cal. 1985); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609, at 89. 
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burden of proof or persuasion.127 The judge first determines, under rule 19(a)'s 
three stated criteria, if an absentee is needed for just adjudication. This is 
achieved by determining whether the absentee has an interest in the case that 
could be harmed by the suit's resolution or whether the entity's absence could 
adversely affect one of the litigants.128 If an absentee is needed, the court next 
decides whether the entity's joinder is feasible, examining subject matter juris-
diction, venue, and service of process. 129 When joinder is feasible, the judge 
must ar-der that the absentee be made a party.130 If absentee joh1der is infeasi-
ble, the court determines under rule 19(b) whether in "equity and good con-
science" the action should proceed without the absentee or be dismissed. 131 
This judgment is to be premised on four stated factors: the plaintiff's forum 
needs, the likelihood of absentee prejudice, the defendant's interest in avoiding 
additional or inconsistent litigation or obligations, and the public's interest in 
efficient dispute resolution, as well as other considerations that may be 
pertinent.132 
127. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 319-21 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Kalmich v. Bruno, 404 
F. Supp. 57, 61 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 940 (1977). See generally Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing proof and persuasion burdens). 
128. The rule provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who [can be served and will not destroy 
jurisdiction and as to whom venue is proper] shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in 
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persens already parties subject to a substantial 
risk of incurring double, multiple; or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. . . . 
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 
144-77. 
129. The rule provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if [the person satisfies one of the three criteria 
stated]. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the 
action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 
178-80. 
130. Rule 19(a) provides in pertinent part that if the absentee "has not been so joined, the court 
shall order that he be made a party." FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). 
131. The rule provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. Ifa person as described in 
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable .... 
FED. R. av. P. 19(b). 
132. The rule provides in pertinent part: 
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment ren-
dered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, 
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment ren-
dered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 
181-255. 
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In a number of instances, the character of this inquiry and of public rights 
litigation means that the relevant joinder difficulty can be solved by following 
the rule's steps. In these cases absentees will be needed for just adjudication due 
to the nature of absentee interests and the way they are affected in public rights 
suits as well as the relative ease with which one rule 19(a) criterion may be met. 
Joinder will be infeasible because of certain characteristics of public rights litiga-
tion, such as the large number and wide geographic distribution of absentees, 
and the comparative difficulty of satisfying all of the rule 19 joinder limitations. 
Accordingly, the inquiry becomes a rule 19(b) query whether it is more fair to 
continue without absentees or to dismiss the plaintiff's case. However, judges 
can employ numerous mechanisms to avoid either extreme alternative, or its 
more detrimental consequences, and accommodate pertinent interests. 
Thus, rule 19 and other available measures better enable courts to solve the 
joinder problem, expeditiously and fairly ending the inquiry. These considera-
tions have important implications for the order, scope, depth, and other aspects 
of the analysis undertaken by judges who may want to follow certain general 
guidelines. 133 There is no prescribed formula for making most determinations 
required by the rule. 134 Thus, courts can exercise substantial discretion, 
pragmatically and flexibly assessing the relevant considerations in each case. 135 
As early as possible in a lawsuit, judges should anticipate and attempt to 
solve the joinder difficulty. At the suit's commencement courts should be aware 
of the joinder question by virtue of rule 19(c), which requires that the plaintiff's 
initial pleading include the identity of entities that may satisfy rule 19(a), but are 
not joined, and why they have not been joined.136 If the plaintiff neglects this 
duty, as often happens in private as well as public rights litigation,137 a problem 
may arise, because the government has less incentive to notify the court or ab-
sentees than do defendants in more traditional cases. 138 Accordingly, judges 
133. In considering the order, for example, judges generally should proceed from the most to the 
least auspicious possibilities, so that some aspects of the analysis can be omitted or performed less 
rigorously. Similarly, the guidance provided by the later analysis does not follow rule 19's steps 
precisely. For discussion of scope and depth, see infra notes 143, 146-48 and accompanying text. 
134. See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118 n.14 (applying rule 19(b)); Northern Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying rule 19(a)); Balda v. County of 
Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying rule 19(a)); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, § 1604, at 35 (discussing the application of rule 19(a)). 
135. See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 117-19; Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties 
Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.5, at 341-42 
(1985); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 42, § 10.13, at 541; 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra 
note 2, § 1604, at 45-46, § 1607, at 59-65; § 1608, at 66. 
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(c). For more discussion of this requirement, see Rule 19 Advisory 
Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1610, at 103, 
§ 1625, at 253. 
137. For a discussion of plaintiffs' neglect in private litigation, see Freer, supra note 16, at 1085-
88. In the recent public rights case of Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), plain-
tiff's counsel did not comply with rule 19(c) because the timing of governmental lease issuance and 
the difficulty of researching lessees' names and addresses in government records would have left 
insufficient time to sue. Interview with Tom France (attorney for plaintiff in Conner) (June 19, 
1986). 
138. This is what counsel for intervenors on appeal in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. 
Mont. 1985), asserts happened in that case. Telephone interview, supra note 118. The government 
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should remember that much public rights litigation potentially poses joinder dif-
ficulties, and they may want to consider several options, such as raising the join-
der issue sua sponte or notifying absentees. 139 
Once judges identify the joinder issue, they should survey the situation, 
searching for promising solutions, such as affording absentees notice and the 
opportunity to enter the litigation.140 At the outset, courts also should canvass 
factual information such as the number of absentees and their location, remedies 
for the joinder problem, such as intervention, and the ramifications of applying 
the mechanisms, such as their practical impact on absentees. 141 Judges then 
should examine more closely all pertinent considerations, particularly the plain-
tiff's and absentees' interests; quantify and refine the considerations, when ap-
propriate; and compare and balance them, as indicated. Because there are 
numerous fair solutions, judges should be wary of terminating the inquiry pre-
maturely. Rather than invoking the Draconian alternatives of dismissing the 
action or proceeding, courts may want to resolve close questions in favor of 
continuing the inquiry. 142 Nonetheless, when a fair solution is available, it 
should be applied and the inquiry ended. Finally, courts always should explain 
their resolution of the joinder issue-making clear which considerations were 
examined and why, and how each consideration figured in the specific 
determination. 143 
B. Specific Guidance 
1. Rule 19(a): Persons Needed for Just Adjudication 
Rule (19)(a) directs courts to ask whether absentees are entities that should 
has less incentive to give notification because it will not subsequently be found liable under existing 
government compensation schemes. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
139. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94 (discussing the possibility of 
court notifying absentees); supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing the possibility of court 
raising sua sponte joinder issue). Professor Freer has suggested that sanctions might be imposed for 
failure to comply with rule 19(c). See Freer, supra note 16, at 1085 n.116. Sanctions may be too 
harsh as applied to the public interest litigant with limited resources and little time to append the 
names of all absentees to the complaint. But judges may want to consider more rigorous enforce-
ment of the requirement, and it is fair to require such a litigant to inform the court of the possible 
existence of absentees, so that the court might institute appropriate action. See Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (nothing in rule 23 suggests notice requirements can be tailored 
to plaintiff's pocketbook). 
140. For instance, such a survey might reveal that absentees are few in number, readily identifi-
able, and nearby, so that notifying them and affording the opportunity to intervene may be a quick, 
easy solution. Indeed, this could be a promising solution in a number of situations, but it appears 
rarely to have been invoked in cases in which the exception was applied. See supra text accompany-
ing note 91. 
141. These are only examples. For more thorough treatment, see infra text accompanying notes 
144-255. Even when this exercise does not end the inquiry, it should facilitate later analysis. 
142. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. Cf Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 
(E.D. Cal. 1985) (helpful example of judicial resolution of close questions); Fink, supra note 31, at 
448 (characterizing such Draconian options as a "cruel choice"). Moreover, proper solutions may 
become clear only at the inquiry's end. 
143. Several circuits have said that a trial judge's rule 19 determination must include a thorough 
statement of the facts and reasons for the decision. See Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 
299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982); Bio-Analytical Serv. v. Edgewater Hosp., 565 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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be joined in the litigation, if feasible. 144 No precise test exists: absentees must 
meet one of three stated criteria, which essentially consider whether absentees 
possess an interest in the suit that could be threatened by its resolution or if their 
absence could jeopardize interests of parties to the case.145 The character of 
absentee interests in, and how they are influenced by, public rights litigation and 
the relatively undemanding, pragmatic nature of the second criterion, rule 
19(a)(2)(i), mean this inquiry will be answered affirmatively in numerous situa-
tions. 146 When the second criterion is not met, it is unlikely that the third crite-
rion, rule 19 (a)(2)(ii), will be met, while the first criterion, rule 19(a)(l), 
apparently has no independent significance. 
In a number of situations judges easily can determine that the second crite-
rion is satisfied. They can then proceed directly to the rule 19(b) component of 
the inquiry. One assessment central to rule 19{b), however, is similar to the one 
needed to determine that the second rule 19{a) criterion is not met. 147 This 
congruity and the possibility of terminating or facilitating numerous inquiries 
warrant focusing on the second criterion.148 
a. Rule 19(a){2)(i): Absentee Interest and Potential Prejudice 
The second criterion asks whether an absentee "claims an interest relating 
to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may ... as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest."149 The criterion can be satisfied when the absentee interest is 
protectable and will be affected considerably if suit continues without the absen-
tee.150 Thus, the nature of absentee interests, and the way they are affected, in 
144. The rule defines those that "should be joined as parties so that they may be heard and a 
complete disposition made." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89. 
145. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 334-44; 7 c. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1604, at 35. The criteria are treated more fully than they 
might otherwise be, because they are similar to three of rule 19(b)'s four stated factors. 
146. These factors may explain why many courts treat rule 19(a) tersely, "assuming the exist-
ence of a person who should be joined if feasible." Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968); accord NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 
rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). But see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying 
text (discussing some courts' technical treatment of absentee interests). 
147. Rule 19(b)'s first stated factor asks "to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence might be prejudicial to him." For analysis of the factor, see infra notes 186-97 and accom-
panying text. This factor may differ subtly from rule 19(a). Rule 19(b) may be more analytical, 
asking about the likelihood of prejudice on the facts of each case, while rule l 9(a) asks whether there 
may be some prejudice. 
148. The approach in the text is meant to foster judicial economy. If courts must refine absentee 
prejudice under rule 19(b), they may as well do so at this juncture, while conducting a similar, albeit 
cruder, inquiry. 
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2)(i). This criterion "recognizes the importance of protecting [the 
absentee] against the practical prejudice to him" of proceeding without that person. Rule 19 Advi-
sory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. 
150. See, e.g., Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlantis Dev. 
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th Cir. 1967); see also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 
1341, 1343-45 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting similar requirements for satisfying rule 24); Nuesse v. Camp, 
385 F.2d 694, 700-02 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting similar requirements for satisfying rule 24); Rule 24 
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 124, at 109-10 (noting that rules 24 and 19 emphasize practical 
prejudice). 
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public rights cases and the criterion's comparatively unrestrictive, pragmatic 
character mean it will be met in numerous instances. Moreover, in most of these 
situations courts easily can detect that the second criterion has been satisfied and 
then tum to rule 19(b). For the reasons stated above, however, judges should 
examine closely absentee interests and the practical impact of proceeding.151 
Courts should scrutinize absentee interests and the pragmatic effect on ab-
sentees in terms of such parameters as substantive legal nature or tangibility. 152 
In analyzing the substantive legal nature of an absentee interest, judges might 
ask whether it is a property right, a contract, or something less, like an opportu-
nity for employment derived from filing an application. In assessing the tangi-
bility of practical effect on absentees, courts could consider whether the impact 
is "immediate and serious, or remote and minor."153 Courts should also assess 
the legal effect of entering judgment in litigation that continues without absen-
tees, such as whether the judgment could have a stare decisis effect and what 
that might mean for absentees' interests. 154 Courts then may want to quantify 
absentee interest and impact on absentees, assigning them preliminary values 
through the use of such parameters as quality and magnitude. 155 Exacting nu-
merical quantification is neither contemplated nor necessary. In most circum-
stances comparing and contrasting should suffice. For instance, a right to 
exclusive possession of property obviously will be accorded greater weight than 
an application for a one-season permit to explore on the public lands. Similarly, 
a judgment that could have an adverse stare decisis effect will be more significant 
than a judgment that would have less persuasive impact. 156 Another helpful 
example, drawn from a pending case, is absentee exploration for, and develop-
ment of, natural resources pursuant to a government lease that is threatened 
with modification by public rights litigation. This interest could be quantified in 
terms of its technical legal character, in terms of money committed to explora-
tion and development, or in terms of the natural resources' worth and how much 
the value of that interest might be diminished by proceeding to judgment with-
151. If judges encounter difficulty securing the requisite data from litigants, courts should con-
tact absentees. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting the possibility of a court notifying 
absentees of litigation). For judicial analysis of absentee interests and practical impacts, see United 
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984); Neusse v. Camp, 385 
F.2d 694, 700-02 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th 
Cir. 1967). 
152. The treatment in this paragraph is not meant to be exhaustive but merely to suggest possi-
ble approaches derived principally from the Advisory Committee Note and case law. 
153. See Rule 19 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 20, at 92. 
154. For example, the stare decisis effect of a judgment adjudicating the applicability of national 
legislation could seriously affect an absentee, because another court would be unlikely to view the 
legislation differently. For more discussion of the technical legal effect of entering judgment, see 
infra notes 167 & 217 and accompanying text, infra note 206. 
155. This approach may appear more art than science and even require crude estimates, but 
courts can do it, often rather easily. But see infra note 193 (discussing rule 19(b) quantification 
difficulties). 
156. Compare the right to exclusive possession at issue in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) with the application for a one-season 
mining permit at issue in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 467-69 (9th Cir. 
1986). The stare decisis effect of a judgment could effectively preclude absentees' opportunity to 
protect their interests. See infra notes 167 & 217 and accompanying text. 
776 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
out absentees. 157 
In performing this analysis, courts should remember that the second crite-
rion explicitly mandates consideration of practical prejudice to absentees; prag-
matism is rule 19's touchstone. Accordingly, several technical concepts that 
could govern application of the criterion should not do so. For instance, judges 
have found that absentees will not be affected adversely when they are "ade-
quately represented" by others who can accurately inform the court of potential 
absentee prejudice and fully and fairly protect absentees' interests in the litiga-
tion.158 But dissimilarities between interests of absentees and governmental de-
fendants, difficulties in measuring and articulating absentee prejudice, questions 
regarding the quality of advocacy, and other complications make it nearly im-
possible to ensure that there will be adequate representation.159 A second, 
rather abstract notion has been enunciated in two recent public rights cases. 160 
The courts have considered absentees with some "interest" in the public lands-
like a subsurface estate mineral fee-not to have a "legally protected interest" in 
the litigation's subject matter. The judges have characterized the subject matter 
of the litigation as challenges to agency procedures or decisions governing use of 
those lands. 161 But each court's pronouncement belies such a technical interpre-
tation of the second criterion and underscores the problems entailed in a techni-
cal reading of that criterion, especially the important practical implications for 
absentees. One court expressly acknowledged the "real financial hardship" im-
posed on absentees prevented from mining during a short summer season and 
explicitly admonished the district court not to "ignore those concerns in passing 
on plans for mining operations."162 The second court expressly recognized that 
the "technical scope of the subject matter of the litigation may not serve as the 
only benchmark of resolution of a joinder motion."163 A closely related techni-
157. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. A similar interest, the "right" of a permittee 
who had discovered coal in commercial quantities on public lands to a preference right coal lease, 
was considered sufficient in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 
F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). However, an application for a one-season mining permit 
was found insufficient in Northern Alaska Envt'I Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 
1986). Several courts have also indicated that the generalized interest of all citizens in an agency 
rule's validity might not suffice. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); 
NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D.D.C. 1982). 
158. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert. 
de11ied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d 
Cir. 1979); see also 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 19.07[2.-1], at 19-106 (citing 
adequate representation for proposition that "as a practical matter" has restrictive and expansive 
side). 
159. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 2J Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, 
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-27 
(9th Cir. 1986) (similar treatment of "adequate representation" under rule 24, which unlike rule 19 
explicitly mandates its consideration), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned 
Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987); National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 383-84 
(10th Cir. 1977) (similar treatment of "adequate representation" under rule 24). 
160. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1986); Sierra 
Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 321-24 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
161. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 468-69; Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321-24. 
162. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 471. 
163. Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 322. 
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cal idea is that public rights litigation affects absentees' interests only minimally 
because these interests are technically independent of the litigation and thus can 
be vindicated in separate, subsequent suits.164 However, this viewpoint trivial-
izes rule 19's significant goal of minimizing multiple litigation.165 The perspec-
tive also ignores pragmatic consequences that may well be compelling for 
absentees; absentees that could be substantially prejudiced by their inability to 
secure efficacious, later relief against the government. 166 A final concern is 
whether the potential stare decisis effect of a judgment rendered in litigation that 
proceeds without absentees satisfies the second criterion's requirement that ab-
sentees' interests be "practically impaired." Because the possible stare decisis 
effect of a judgment in public rights litigation, such as suits that adjudicate the 
applicability of national legislation, can affect absentees' interests significantly, 
that impact should suffice. 167 
Thus, this evaluation indicates that rule 19(a)(2)(i) will be satisfied in nu-
merous circumstances. There might be some instances, however, when this sec-
ond criterion is not met. In such situations judges then must determine whether 
the rule's first or third criterion is satisfied. 
b. Rule 19(a)(l) and (2)(ii) 
The first criterion, rule 19(a)(l), "stresses the desirability of joining those 
persons in whose absence the court would be obliged to grant partial or 'hollow' 
rather than complete relief to the parties before the court."168 Public rights 
litigation arguably does not satisfy this criterion's literal terms, because 
"[c]omplete relief refers to relief as between the persons already parties, not as 
between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought."169 In public 
rights cases the governmental defendant is said to be the only entity responsible 
for the challenged activity as well as the only entity sought to be, and actually, 
bound, so that comprehensive relief can be afforded between the litigants.17° 
Judges may reject this proposition either because they find it overly technical or 
164. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321-24. 
165. See infra notes 172, 238 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra text accompanying note 118; infra notes 167, 238-39 and accompanying text. 
167. See Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlantis Dev. 
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th Cir. 1967); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. 
MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 339; see also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(stare decisis effect should suffice under rule 24); Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement 
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1180-83 (1976) (contextual analysis of stare decisis). See infra note 
206 (suggesting that absentee who failed to enter suit when able to do so might be bound by determi-
nation in suit). Indeed, absentees' opportunity to protect themselves may be effectively precluded 
when one federal court adjudicates the applicability of national legislation, because another federal 
court will be unlikely to view the legislation differently. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
168. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. Rule 19(a)(l) states that an absentee 
"shall be joined if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties." 
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(l). 
169. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 321 n.26 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (citation omitted); accord 
Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986). 
170. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 468; Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321 n.26. 
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because they pragmatically recognize the potential for absentee prejudice. 171 
However, if courts find the proposition too abstract or refute it on pragmatic 
grounds, the remaining consideration relevant to this criterion-rulemaker con-
cern that parties would pursue multiple litigation 172-will not materialize be-
cause the plaintiff and the defendant have no reason to bring additional claims 
when courts grant complete relief.173 
The third criterion, rule 19(a)(2)(ii), asks "whether a party may be left, 
after the adjudication, in a position where a person not joined can subject him to 
a double or otherwise inconsistent liability."174 In public rights litigation the 
only conceivable circumstance under which a governmental defendant may in-
cur such responsibilities is when absentees are sufficiently prejudiced to pursue 
independent actions and, therefore, satisfy the second criterion, rule 19(a)(2)(i). 
Absentees will have little reason to sue separately unless they are injured enough 
to meet that criterion. 175 Even then, however, the government will not be "sub-
ject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations."176 The government may owe no legal responsibility to the absen-
tee or the harm sustained may not support a cause of action. 177 
In short, there may be situations in which none of the three rule 19(a) crite-
ria is met, so the inquiry may end. In most instances, however, the second crite-
rion will be satisfied. In a small number of these circumstances it will be 
possible to avoid the rule 19(b) inquiry, if the rule's joinder requirements can be 
met. 
2. Rule 19 Joinder Limitations 
If an absentee needed for just adjudication under rule 19(a) can be served, 
does not make a valid objection to venue, and will not deprive the court of juris-
diction, the "court shall order that he be made a party."178 These determina-
tions regarding the feasibility of joinder involve a plethora of complex issues that 
demand consideration of other federal rules, the United States Code, state stat-
utes, and the Constitution. Accordingly, it is exceedingly difficult to determine 
whether all the limitations are satisfied and whether joinder is feasible in specific 
171. See supra notes 162, 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing practical prejudice to absen-
tees). It is important to understand, however, that absentee prejudice is not a relevant consideration 
under this criterion, although it is relevant under rule 19(a)(2)(ii) and the first stated factor of rule 
19(b). 
172. Rule 19(a)(l) advances the public interest in "avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essen-
tial subject matter." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. 
173. This obviously is related to the first consideration discussed supra notes 169-70 and accom-
panying text. Of course, absentees might pursue multiple litigation, but that is not relevant to this 
criterion. See supra note 171. For helpful analysis of the criterion, concluding that it "lacks in-
dependent significance and ought to be jettisoned," see Freer, supra note 16, at 1062-63, 1080-82. 
174. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 149-67. 
176. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(ii); see also Freer, supra note 16, at 1095 n.163 (absentee that is 
unlikely to recover does not pose such a risk). 
177. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text; see also Bozcon v. Northwestern Elevator 
Co., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (E. D. Wis. 1987); FED. PROC. L. Bo. § 59:83 (1984) (joinder not 
ordered when risk only of frivolous suit or absentee has no cause of action). 
178. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). 
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cases. 179 In some situations every joinder requirement may be met so that the 
absentee may be joined and the inquiry terminated. 180 But the multitude and 
relative stringency of constraints, as well as peculiar characteristics of public 
rights litigation, such as the substantial number and geographic dispersion of 
absentees, suggest that joinder will not be feasible in a number of circumstances. 
Judges then must turn to the rule 19(b) element of the inquiry. 
3. Rule 19(b): Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible 
When it is infeasible to join an absentee needed for just adjudication, the 
court must "determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable."181 No formula exists for making this 
judgment, which the Supreme Court has admonished "must be based on factors 
varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some pro-
cedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against 
opposing interests."182 Some guidance, however, can be suggested. 
179. These considerations may explain why most courts treat joinder limitations tersely or as-
sume some defect exists. The considerations, as compounded by the factual variations in public 
rights cases, complicate meaningful generalization and make comprehensive exploration of all rele-
vant questions beyond this Article's scope. For helpful discussions, see 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 19.01-1.; 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1602, 1605-06, 
1610. Nonetheless, courts should search for defects and explain clearly any found. See R. MARCUS 
& E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION 63-65 (1985) (analyzing many issues judges could consider 
in determining joinder's feasibility). 
180. The rule mandates joinder if feasible and dismissal if all absentees cannot be made parties. 
This requirement is problematic in cases like Eldredge v. carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Ap-
prenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 917 
(1982). In that case, even if 4500 absent employers could have been joined, the litigation would have 
been unmanageable. Similarly, in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal 
filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986), intervenors argued that the intra-jurisdictional 
location of several hundred lessees and assignees mandated joinder. But plaintiff's counsel claimed 
suit would be precluded, were joinder required (1) at the outset, because timing of lease issuance and 
the difficulty of identifying absentees would have left insufficient time to sue, or (2) later, because of 
the expense entailed. Interview with Tom France (June 19, 1986) (attorney for plaintiff in Conner). 
Thus, a more flexible approach may be warranted by the considerations above, by the idea that 
judicial discretion should be as great here as under rule l 9(b ), and by the idea that representational 
substitutes, like a defendant's class action, could respond to rule 19 concerns. See Kaplan, supra 
note 5, at 403 n.178; Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978) (discussing 
defendant class action suits). Nonetheless, cases such as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 
(1974) and Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), suggest that the federal 
judiciary should follow strictly or read literally the requirements of the Federal Rules, especially 
those implicating plaintiff's notification costs. See infra note 225. 
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
182. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968). "Whether 
a person is 'indispensable' ... can only be determined in the context of particular litigation." Id. at 
118. The rulemakers stressed pragmatism, see Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92, 
while the Court found the "new version emphasize[d] the pragmatic consideration of the effects of 
the alternatives of proceeding or dismissing." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 117 n.12; accord, 
Eldredge v. carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917, 
920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. 
MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 341 (noting that courts have substantial discretion to make equity 
and good conscience determination); cf. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 42, § 10.13, at 542-43 
(noting that courts have substantial discretion to make equity and good conscience determination); 7 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1604, at 45-46, § 1607, at 65, § 1608, at 66 (noting that 
courts have substantial discretion to make equity and good conscience determination). 
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The operative "equity and good conscience" language speaks in absolute 
terms of continuing without absentees or dismissing the plaintiff's case. Never-
theless, numerous measures can be applied to avoid each possibility or its more 
deleterious aspects, and these mechanisms should be invoked, when appropri-
ate.183 Rule 19(b) "uses the word 'indispensable' only in a conclusory sense";184 
judges are to determine whether absentees are indispensable only after consider-
ing pertinent factors. 185 Four factors, derived from prior case law, were explic-
itly included in the subdivision,186 because the 1938 "rule did not state 
affirmatively what factors were relevant." 187 The Supreme Court has found that 
the four factors implicate the plaintiff's interest in a forum, 188 the interest of the 
absentee, 189 the defendant's need to avoid "multiple litigation, or inconsistent 
relief, or sole responsibility" for liability shared with another, 190 the public inter-
est in "complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies,"191 and 
the "possibility of shaping relief to accommodate these four interests."192 
Although the factors do overlap to some extent, they are not very similar or 
amenable to measurement. 193 The four factors are neither inflexible standards 
nor equally applicable in all contexts.194 Furthermore, the stated factors are not 
exclusive; thus, courts may consider other factors that should be pertinent to 
equity and good conscience. 195 These facts may explain why neither rule 19(b) 
nor the Advisory Committee's Note expressly mention assigning values or pri-
183. The rulemakers prescribed many measures to avoid proceeding or dismissing. See Rule 19 
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; see also infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text 
(discussing measures rulemakers prescribed and other measures). 
184. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93; accord Freer, supra note 16, at 1077 
n.83. 
185. "[A] person is 'regarded as indispensable' when he cannot be made a party and, upon con-
sideration of the factors above-mentioned, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable 
to dismiss the action ••.. " Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93 (emphasis added). 
This and the quotation supra text accompanying note 184 appear verbatim in Provident Tradesmens 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 n.15 (1968). See also supra text accompanying 
note 115 (Court's reiteration of ideas in two rulemaker excerpts). "Factor" is the rulemakers' term 
to describe what judges are to consider, and it is so used in this Article. 
186. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92. 
187. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92. For an explanation of these factors, 
see id. at 91-92. 
188. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109 (1968). 
189. Id. at 110. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 111. 
192. Id. This Article uses the "interest" approach articulated by the Supreme Court. 
193. For discussions of this overlap, see Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 
1030, 1043 n.15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra 
note 20, at 92. Comparison of the stated factors' terminology also illustrates that they overlap. 
Dissimilarities between the factors and difficulties of measuring them are best illustrated by an exam-
ple. How can termination of a case brought by one "public interest group" plaintiff that purports to 
represent millions of people and the potential prejudice to hundreds of absentees of proceeding with-
out them be assigned values so as to be meaningfully compared? 
194. See Trombino v. Transit Casualty Co., 110 F.R.D. 139, 143 (D.R.I. 1986); 7 C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1607-08 (discussing the factors' flexibility). A helpful example offiexi-
bility appears in the second and third stated factors, which ask judges to consider the extent of 
prejudice to the absentee. 
195. "The factors are .•. not intended to exclude other considerations which may be applicable 
in particular situations." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; accord Provident 
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 112 (1968). For discussions of the factors' 
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orities to the stated factors, or additional factors relevant to equity and good 
conscience or balancing the factors in reaching conclusions.196 Nonetheless, 
strong concern for plaintiffs' and absentees' interests-evidenced by the subdivi-
sion's explicit provision for their consideration and the rulemakers expressly 
stated reasons for doing so-indicates that both interests are integral to the rule 
19(b) inquiry. 197 
Thus, this inquiry differs in certain particulars from the rule 19(a) inquiry. 
Rule 19(b) in terms contemplates a relatively complex process of analysis, asking 
judges to do equity by considering the difficult-to-assess effects on diverse inter-
ests of dismissing plaintiff's suit or proceeding without absentees. Moreover, 
courts must consider numerous measures whose invocation could avoid either 
dismissal or continuing without absentees.198 But there are similarities between 
the rule 19(a) and rule 19(b) inquiries. Most telling is the comparable ease with 
which each inquiry may be completed; indeed, courts rather easily can answer 
the crucial rule 19(b) equity and good conscience query in numerous situa-
relevance to equity and good conscience, see Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 729 F.2d 
70, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607, at 65. 
196. Professor Fink initially identified the absence of hierarchical weighting. See Fink, supra 
note 31, at 424. Of course, the nonexclusive nature of the four stated factors makes this very diffi-
cult, see supra note 195, and the problem is compounded by attempting to contrast factors not 
susceptible to comparison, see supra note 193. But case-by-case determinations can be premised on 
the considerations present, especially when they differ greatly, and on factors' inclusion in the rule or 
the language used. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Provident Tradesmens 
Court championed case-by-case analysis and provided for the possibilities of interest balancing and 
assertion of compelling interests. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 
102, 119 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 182; see also Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. 
Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging that rule 19(b) establishes a balancing process); Tick v. 
Cohen, 787 F.2d 1490, 1494 (I Ith Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that rule 19(b) establishes a balancing 
process). 
197. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-93 (discussing rulemaker ratio-
nales). The first three factors mention or implicate absentee interests, and the fourth treats the 
plaintiff's interest. The fourth factor asks also whether the plaintiff will have adequate relief if the 
action is dismissed, while the initial two consider the extent of potential prejudice to the absentee and 
the potential for reduction of this prejudice, thus perhaps evincing more solicitude for plaintiffs. 
Later judicial pronouncements have confirmed the importance of the two interests. See, e.g., Provi-
dent Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). But many judges now 
find most important the plaintiff's forum needs. See Pasco Int'! (London) v. Stenograph Corp., 637 
F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 
1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), 
appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 
2, 11 19.07-2[0], at 19-132 n.13; 11 19.07-2[4], at 19-154. Indeed, Professor Freer recently observed 
that "[t]hough this is but one factor in a multifactor balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to 
primary importance by their reluctance to dismiss in the absence of an adequate alternative forum." 
Freer, supra note 16, at 1078 (footnote omitted); see also Von Bulow ex rel Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 
634 F. Supp. 1284, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (illustrating court's reluctance to dismiss); Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978) (illustrating court's reluctance to dismiss); 7 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609, at 83 (noting courts' extreme reluctance to dismiss); 
id. § 1604, at 45 (rule's philosophy to avoid dismissal whenever possible). 
198. Thus, courts are asked for a very discretionary judgment, based on a quite general standard, 
and numerous, complex calculations, so the task appears at once open-ended and polycentric. In 
contrast, rule 19(a) asks if one rather easily satisfied criterion is met. These and other differences 
thus warrant somewhat dissimilar treatment, which focuses on plaintiffs' and absentees' interests and 
seeks felicitous solutions by accommodating both. See supra note 147 (noting the subtle difference 
between rule 19(a) and rule 19(b)'s first stated factor). 
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tions. 199 In many cases the substantial disparity between plaintiffs' and absen-
tees' interests and the importance the subdivision accords both interests mean 
the inquiry can be resolved easily; one interest will clearly be much more signifi-
cant than the other. Many other instances can be treated almost as easily. In 
some, reconsideration and refinement of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests will 
disclose considerable disparity between them, while in the rest, examination of 
additional relevant considerations alone, or with the two refined interests, will be 
dispositive. This analysis suggests that a few, comparatively problematic cir-
cumstances remain, but even they can be treated.200 
a. Preliminary Survey 
The character of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests in public rights suits and 
the significance rule 19(b) assigns them mean the inquiry can be easily resolved 
because one interest obviously will be much greater than the other. In the vast 
majority of these cases the plaintiff's interest in proceeding will be substantial, if 
the case is dismissed, while absentees' interests will be small should the litigation 
proceed. More specifically, the plaintiff's forum needs will be very difficult to 
accommodate; absentees' large number and wide geographic distribution in pub-
lic rights actions mean that the plaintiff either will have no forum or ineffective 
alternatives.201 Thus, dismissing the suit essentially will foreclose it.202 For ex-
ample, in a recent case involving public lands in seventeen states and implicating 
interests of even more broadly dispersed absentees, the court observed: 
Because of problems of jurisdiction and venue, plaintiff could never 
join all defendants in one forum. Requiring it to bring seventeen sepa-
rate lawsuits or even to combine actions through the device of mul-
tidistrict litigation would create enormous administrative disorder and 
delay. Dismissal, therefore, would effectively discourage and, for all 
199. There are other similarities. For instance, the way rule 19(a)'s analysis of absentee preju-
dice is structured makes it like the absentee prejudice analysis of rule 19(b). Moreover, rule 19(a)'s 
three criteria implicate essentially the same concerns as rule 19(b )'s first three stated factors. 
200. The guidance provided by this analysis is meant to maximize quick resolution of the rule 
19(b) inquiry. Thus, it could expose judges to criticism for being unclear or too terse. The guidance 
is meant to provide a thorough analytical framework, and when courts do not complete the inquiry 
because they find a solution, judges need only explain it to avoid criticism. For full analysis, focusing 
on the four factors, see 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 1119.07-2; 7 c. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1607-08. 
201. As applied to plaintiffs' and absentees' interests in this Article, "efficacy" implicates ability 
to protect those interests and subsumes "convenience," which includes cost. For example, an alter-
native forum's efficacy includes whether the case would proceed, and, if so, possible delay and its 
impact on the plaintiff's potential relief, and the expense of suing elsewhere. 
202. Foreclosing suit implicates the fourth factor that asks whether "plaintiff will have an ade-
quate remedy if the action is dismissed." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); see also Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. 
Supp. 305, 325 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the " 'public interest exception' is the effectuation" of 
this factor); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, 
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93 (look-
ing to dismissal's "practical effects" and the existence of any assurance the plaintiff could sue effec-
tively in another forum where better joinder possible); supra note 197 (citing examples of many 
courts' phrasing question as one of availability of an alternative forum and characterizing as critical 
consideration). 
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practical purposes, put an end to this litigation. 203 
Correspondingly, in some of these circumstances absentees' interests would be 
insubstantial, as would be potential prejudice.204 In other instances in which 
absentees' interests are greater, those interests can be protected with many 
rather convenient measures, a number of which could secure absentee presence 
in the litigation. 205 
Significant among these mechanisms are some that can be invoked by ab-
sentees, assuming they are aware that suit has been filed. Absentees may appear 
voluntarily or intervene on an ancillary basis in the case.206 When entry of a 
large number of absentees would be expensive for individual absentees or com-
plicate the litigation, the absentees could pool their resources and have their 
interests protected by representative absentees or an entity like Mountain States 
Legal Foundation.207 Absentees might also request transfer of the suit to a 
203. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); 
NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per 
curiarn). Of course, such litigation, ·which challenges federal activity by invoking federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), intrinsically eliminates the "most common alternative" 
available to a plaintiff dismissed for nonjoinder-relitigation in state court. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, 
M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 343. 
204. See, e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468·69 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981). This situation implicates the first factor, 
which asks to "what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him" 
or "[ w ]ould the absentee be adversely affected in a practical sense, and if so, would the prejudice be 
immediate and serious, or remote and minor?" Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; 
see also supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text (discussing similar inquiry for rule 19(a)(2)(i)). 
205. The possibility of applying these measures principally implicates the second factor, asking 
the "extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided." FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b). Thus, it includes the 
measures available as well as their effect on prejudice and the inconvenience they entail. This is not 
an exhaustive catalog of the measures but includes those most likely to apply in most situations. 
Moreover, some can be used in combination. For comprehensive analysis of all the measures men-
tioned infra notes 206-14, 220-22 and accompanying text, most of which are drawn from other 
Federal Rules or the United States Code and some of which may not apply to the relevant joinder 
question, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 42, ch. 10; 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
supra note 2, ~ 19; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1600-26. 
206. The rulemakers recommended that courts encourage absentees to initiate the measures and 
consider if undue hardship would result. Professor Kaplan suggested that if hardship did not occur, 
absentee "inaction with knowledge may be pertinent" to dismissal or continuing. See Rule 19 Advi-
sory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 365-66. In Provident Tradesmens 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968), the Court indicated that an absentee who 
fails to enter a case when able to do so might be bound by a determination in that suit. Accord 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 452 (D.D.C. 1978). The resolution suggested 
would implicate due process because "due process prohibits the assertion of claim or issue preclusion 
against one who was neither a party to prior litigation nor represented by ... a party there." Freer, 
supra note 16, at 1082; see also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1608, at 76 (noting that 
the Supreme Court has not conclusively resolved the issue of whether absentees might be bound); 18 
c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE. & PROCEDURE.: CIVIL§ 4452 (1981) (suggesting 
approaches for resolving issue). Absentees also may intervene on appeal, as happened in Conner v. 
Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 
1986). For discussion of the problem of absentee notification in public rights litigation, see supra 
notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
207. Absentees employed arrangements similar to this in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Ho-
del, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, 
No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986); and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 
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more appropriate forum when the district selected by the plaintiff is too inconve-
nient. 208 Numerous other measures could be invoked by litigants or judges. For 
example, governmental defendants may be able to represent absentees ade-
quately. Agencies might also be able to secure absentee presence in cases involv-
ing a res like land through mechanisms such as interpleader.209 Of course, 
defendants and plaintiffs always can inform absentees that suit has been brought, 
and courts may notify absentees and invite their participation.210 Judges, how-
ever, have many additional devices at their command. Courts might transfer 
cases to another forum "in the interest of justice"211 or certify a class of absen-
tees when they are sufficiently numerous.212 Judges may also be able to protect 
absentees by delaying absentee realization of interests pending governmental 
compliance with the plaintiff's request for relief.213 For instance, courts could 
postpone Interior Department issuance of permits to absentees for development 
of natural resources discovered on the public lands until the Department com-
pleted preparation of an environmental impact statement considering the envi-
ronmental consequences of development.214 Accordingly, in numerous 
situations the plaintiff's interest will be so much larger than absentees' interests 
as to clearly outweigh them. 
In a small number of situations, however, essentially the opposite situation 
1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For helpful analyses of "public 
interest groups," like Mountain States Legal Foundation, that represent regulated interests, see 
Houck, supra note 62; Farney, Mountain States' Conservative Legal Bite Loses Strength Due to Fund-
ing Woes, Ideological Rifts, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1987, at 50, col. 1. 
208. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) & 1406(a) (1982) prescribe transfer if it is "in the interest of justice;" 
See also 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-3 (1987) (administrative conference of the United States Recommenda-
tion that Congress expressly provide for intervenor transfer requests). For additional discussion of 
transfer, see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1387-88 (D.D.C. 1986); 
15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 3807, at 78-79; § 3827, 
at 172 (1976); see also Freer, supra note 16, at 1098 n. 179 (requiring intervention does not take from 
absentee's due process objections to suit's locus). 
209. For helpful analysis ofinterpleader, see Freer, supra note 16, at 1093-94. lmpleader also is 
available. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). However, both mechanisms generally are inapplicable. See 
supra notes 93, 158-59 and accompanying text (discussing the fortuity of, and difficulties entailed in 
ensuring, adequate representation). 
210. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94. Courts considering the joinder 
question cannot compel absentees to enter the litigation. But if judges in subsequent litigation con-
sider absentees bound by the earlier case, see supra note 206, the possibility of such later treatment 
could effectively compel entry and might have due process implications. Of course, an important 
problem in some public rights litigation has been the failure of plaintiffs and defendants to notify the 
court of absentees' existence, much less notify absentees of the litigation. See supra notes 137-38 and 
accompanying text. 
211. See supra note 208. 
212. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 19 and rule 23 are mutually exclusive, because rule 23 pre-
supposes that the number of entities involved renders joinder impracticable. Nonetheless, rule 
23(b)(l), which mirrors rule 19(a)(2) and is meant to address similar prejudice, affords the possibility 
of a class action when the number of absentees is substantial. 
213. The possibility of shaping relief implicates rule 19(b)'s second stated factor, suggesting that 
courts consider the "extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of 
relief, or other measures [absentee] prejudice can be lessened or avoided." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
214. Similar possibilities were suggested in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 
1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (per curiam) and NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 408 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). For discussion of certain 
difficulties entailed in shaping relief, like absentee need to explore during short seasons, see infra note 
231 and accompanying text. 
1987] PUBLIC RIGHTS LITIGATION AND PARTY JOINDER 785 
will be present. In most of these instances absentees' interests will be substantial 
should the case continue, while the plaintiff's interest will be insignificant if the 
case is dismissed. More specifically, absentees' needs to protect their interests in 
such situations will be very difficult to accommodate. The plaintiff's ability to 
choose a forum in public rights litigation means that the case could proceed in a 
forum quite distant from and very inconvenient for absentees. Moreover, in 
public rights litigation, the peculiar character of the questions at issue, the sub-
stantial nature of absentee interests at stake, the telling effect on those interests 
of entering judgment, and the special character of existing government compen-
sation systems mean that absentees could be affected significantly were the plain-
tiff to sue successfully.215 Therefore, entering the litigation would be quite 
expensive for absentees, while continuing without absentees would prejudice 
·their interests substantially. 
As to absentee expense for example, public interest litigants often challenge 
in the District Court for the District of Columbia governmental activity relating 
to public lands situated in the West and implicating interests of absentees lo-
cated there.216 Moreover, prejudice to absentees of proceeding without them is 
illustrated by the several ways in which absentees' opportunities to protect their 
interests may effectively be precluded. When one federal court has adjudicated 
the applicability or statutory meaning of national legislation that implicates ab-
sentees' interests, another federal court will be unlikely to view the legislation 
differently.217 When a trial judge has resolved sharply contested issues of fact 
implicating absentees' interests, appellate courts likely will defer to those deter-
minations. 218 Moreover, absentees cannot successfully pursue subsequent litiga-
215. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (noting the peculiar character of questions at 
issue). For explanations and examples of the remaining propositions, see supra notes 4, 117-18 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
216. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, 
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also National Coal Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668 
(D.D.C. 1984) (court dismissed litigation against government brought by coal producers' trade asso-
ciation in District of Columbia involving public lands in Montana and suggested that District Court 
for District of Montana was an adequate alternative forum); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 
(D.D.C. 1981) (suit involving lands in Oklahoma). 
217. For helpful discussion of numerous reasons for this judicial reluctance and its implications, 
see NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1978); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699-
703 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1967). 
Within each federal circuit, courts are especially reluctant to view legislation differently, because of 
considerations of judicial economy, mutual respect, stare decisis, practice, and custom. Some of 
these considerations also operate between circuits, although circuits are more willing to differ. See, 
e.g., Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), see also 
Comment, Administrative Agency lntracircuit Non-Acquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985) 
(noting sporadic government agency practice of not following precedent within circuits). 
218. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1984); FED. R. C1v. 
P. 52(a); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL,§§ 2585, 2589 
(1971); see also Louis, A/locating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and 
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural 
Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 1007-17 (1986) (documenting "shift of decisional power towards the 
trial level"). Given this deferential standard of appellate review, absentees may lose the only mean-
ingful opportunity to protect themselves. Trial judges apparently have resolved factual issues with-
out absentees in few public rights cases, although this did happen in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. 
Supp. 107 (D. Mont 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986). 
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tion against the government for investments made in reliance on government 
representations, because satisfactory relief is unavailable under existing compen-
sation schemes.219 
In some situations, when absentee interests are great, the plaintiff's interest 
will be small. In the remaining cases, in which the plaintiff's forum needs are 
more substantial, they can be accommodated by invoking certain rather conve-
nient measures. A court may transfer the case, when all the absentees are lo-
cated in a single federal district other than the forum selected by the plaintiff. 220 
A judge may also dismiss the plaintiff's litigation, if the plaintiff can file suit 
again relatively easily in a district where absentees could protect their interests 
more conveniently. 221 Dismissal even may be possible when the plaintiff can sue 
relatively conveniently in more than one forum and combine actions with mul-
tidistrict litigation in a forum where absentees could be represented conveniently 
by a single entity. 222 
In short, the rule 19(b) inquiry can be completed rather easily and appro-
priately in numerous instances because the plaintiff's or absentees' interests will 
predominate. However, a number of other situations can be resolved with simi-
lar facility by re-examining, and refining, plaintiffs' and absentees' interests or by 
consulting additional pertinent considerations. 
b. Secondary Survey 
i. Refinement of the Plaintiff's and Absentees' Interests 
The plaintiff's interest should be analyzed in terms of the efficacy of pursu-
ing relief in the forum chosen or elsewhere. The absentees' interests should be 
considered with respect to the prejudice that would be incurred in continuing 
without them, how effectively available mechanisms can protect absentees' inter-
ests, and the inconvenience of invoking the measures. Thus, considerable analy-
sis should be undertaken by a court when conducting the rule 19(b) preliminary 
survey and the rule 19(a) assessment of absentee interest and prejudice.223 
Nonetheless, rule 19(b) requires more refined analysis at this juncture, because 
neither the plaintiff's nor absentees' interests significantly outweighed the other 
in the preliminary survey. Thus, both interests should be assessed more closely, 
especially in light of the implications of applying the measures mentioned above, 
219. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
221. See, e.g., McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1969); National Coal Ass'n v. 
Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1984). 
222. Numerous plaintiffs' "public interest groups," such as the Sierra Club; public interest 
groups representing those regulated, like Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF); and trade 
associations, such as the American Mining Congress, have offices in Washington, D.C. Most of 
these entities also have offices in the West. For example, the Sierra Club has offices in Denver, 
Colorado, San Francisco, California, and Juneau, Alaska, while MSLF is headquartered in Denver. 
For more information on multidistrict litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982); D. HERR, MULTIDIS-
TRICT LITIGATION (1986); 15 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 208, at§§ 3861-3900; infra note 
229. 
223. See, e.g., supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (relevant analysis of the plaintiff's 
interests); supra notes 149-67, 204-14 and accompanying text (relevant analysis of absentees' 
interests). 
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to determine whether one interest predominates.224 
The plaintiff's interest can be refined by assessing the consequences of con-
tinuing the litigation in the forum where plaintiff brought the action, assuming 
that absentees would be willing to enter the suit. 225 For example, judges might 
calculate the costs of securing absentee presence in the case, which could include 
the expense of identifying absentees in government records and notifying the 
absentees,226 or courts might consider to what extent entry of absentees might 
complicate the litigation.227 Judges may also refine their analysis of the plain-
tiff's interests by exploring the implications of ordering dismissal, assuming the 
availability of an alternative forum. For instance, courts could estimate the cost 
of relitigating in another district, including the expense entailed in traveling to a 
distant forum.228 They could also consider the extent to which plaintiff's relief 
would be delayed were suits brought in multiple districts and combined through 
the multidistrict litigation mechanism. 229 
Judges can refine their analysis of absentees' interests by analyzing the po-
tential prejudice absentees could suffer if the plaintiff's case proceeded without 
them. For example, courts should examine the precise legal nature, or magni-
tude, of absentees' interests or evaluate what effect judgment would have on 
224. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive but rather suggests promising approaches by 
affording examples that are most likely to occur. Measures whose application was rejected in the 
preliminary survey, because one interest predominated or because the measures were relatively in-
convenient, may well apply here. The interests at this point are relatively similar and can profitably 
be refined by comparing them in terms of the relative inconvenience to each of invoking the 
measures. 
225. Absentees cannot be compelled to enter the suit. See supra note 210. Other assumptions 
that are important will be discussed later, but some will not be discussed for reasons of convenience 
and brevity. For example, it is superfluous to repeat the determination made earlier that absentee 
joinder is infeasible. Cases like Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which say the 
federal judiciary is to follow strictly or read literally the requirements of the Federal Rules, arguably 
make irrelevant consideration of factors not mentioned explicitly in rule 19, such as expenses the 
plaintiff might incur. But the Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, does state that rule 
19(b)'s "fourth factor, looking to the practical effects of a dismissal, indicates that the court should 
consider whether there is any assurance that the plaintiff, if dismissed, could sue effectively in an-
other forum where better joinder would be possible." Id. at 93. Thus, the plaintiff's expense appears 
relevant to whether suit could be brought elsewhere. See infra note 251. Moreover, courts may 
consider factors pertinent to equity and good conscience, much as those discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 247-51. See supra note 195. 
226. For discussion of the difficulties entailed in identifying absentees, much less securing their 
presence, in public rights litigation, see supra note 180. 
227. For example, entry of a large number of absentees could complicate the litigation considera-
bly were they to demand that numerous, new issues be treated. See infra note 250 and accompany-
ing text. Application of representational substitutes, in tum, then may be appropriate. See supra 
notes 180, 207 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
229. One court rejected the multidistrict litigation option, because it would "create enormous 
administrative disorder and delay" and effectively end the suit. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 
23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also supra note 222 
(discussing the multidistrict litigation option). Delay can be important in certain public rights litiga-
tion, especially cases challenging activity like mining on the public lands that threatens endangered 
species, such as grizzly bears. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly 
Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For cogent treatment of the effect of delaying the 
plaintiff's relief and of the financial implications for public interest litigants of invoking many meas-
ures, see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88 (D.D.C. 1986); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978). 
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those interests. This could be done by considering various factors, such as the 
nature of the questions to be resolved in the suit, the character of the remedy 
sought by the plaintiff, or the unavailability of later, effective relief against the 
govemment.230 Judges could also refine absentees' interests by determining how 
efficaciously existing measures would protect those interests. For example, a 
judicial attempt to protect absentees by delaying realization of their interests 
pending governmental compliance with the plaintiff's requested relief can sub-
stantially harm those absentees who wish to explore for natural resources on 
public lands and who have only short seasons in which to conduct such opera-
tions. 231 Courts as well could refine their analysis of absentees' interests by ex-
amining the convenience of applying certain mechanisms. For example, judges 
might estimate the absentees' expense of entering the action, which could in-
clude examining information such as the absentees' distance from the forum. 232 
When refined judicial analysis indicates that either the plaintiff's or absen-
tees' interests are significantly larger, this determination will be conclusive.233 
But even if there is not considerable disparity between them, that differential 
should suffice.234 Nonetheless, in the small number of situations in which the 
disparities between the two interests are relatively small, courts should evaluate 
other pertinent considerations.235 
ii. Additional Relevant Considerations 
Courts should analyze unexplored dimensions of rule 19(b)'s four stated 
factors by examining the potential ramifications of both continuing without re-
quiring absentee joinder and dismissing the plaintiff's case for interests other 
than those of plaintiffs and absentees. 236 The principal result of continuing the 
suit is multiple litigation, especially its impact on the defendant and the pub-
230. These factors are all considered supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
231. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986) (example of 
absentee with short season); Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985) (example of 
absentee with short season), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986); supra notes 
213-14 and accompanying text (general discussion of shaping relief). Of course, these cases provide 
the foil to the plaintiff's argument regarding delayed relief, discussed supra note 229 and accompa-
nying text. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-
5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court found it impossible to shape relief to protect absentees, and 
this may be true of much other public rights litigation. See also Freer, supra note 16, at 1095 n.166 
(making similar observation about private litigation). 
232. The Advisory Committee Note states that the "court should consider whether [entry] 
would impose undue hardship on the absentee." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 
92. For mechanisms that might ameliorate expense, such as representation by entities like MSLF, 
see supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
233. For example, closer scrutiny may reveal one interest is much different than it appeared 
initially. 
234. For instance, the plaintiff's forum needs, although not gigantic, may be considerable, and 
absentee prejudice may be more than minimal, yet relatively small. 
235. For example, the plaintiff may have a rather inefficacious forum, while absentees would be 
comparably (1) prejudiced, if suit proceeded or (2) inconvenienced in protecting their interests. 
236. Interests of the plaintiff and absentees were found relatively similar under the preceding 
analysis. Other interests are examined now, because in most situations they become significant only 
at this point. 
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lic.237 In cases involving vindication of public rights, there is little prospect of 
successful, subsequent suit by absentees against the government. Later litigation 
is likely only when the public rights case prejudiced absentees significantly, and 
even then the government may have no legal obligation or the injury may not 
support a cause of action. 238 For example, absentees who have invested substan-
tial funds exploring for natural resources in reliance on government-issued leases 
that the courts effectively invalidated in public rights litigation may have no 
satisfactory remedy against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
Court of Claims suits, or the Constitution. 239 But if courts find that such subse-
quent litigation is possible, they should estimate costs to the government, 240 the 
judicial system, and ultimately the public in hearing similar claims.241 Courts 
should also assess the effect on interests other than the plaintiff and absentees of 
dismissing the plaintiff's case. The chief consequence is ending the plaintiff's 
suit, which implicates numerous "public policy" factors, such as resolution of 
controversial issues on their merits and government accountability. 242 More 
specifically, one judge recently characterized the public's interest in management 
of the public lands as a "matter of transcending importance."243 Other, less 
significant, because less likely, consequences of dismissing are that dismissed 
plaintiffs will be able to relitigate in an alternative forum or sue in more than one 
district and combine cases through multidistrict litigation.244 If those alterna-
tives appear viable, courts should consider the costs to the public and the judi-
cial system should the options be exercised. 245 
237. Multiple litigation that results from continuing implicates rule 19(b)'s first three stated fac-
tors, relating to interests "of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settle-
ment of controversies" and of defendants in avoiding more suits or inconsistent obligations. 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-12 (1968); cf Rule 19 
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92-93 (discussing multiple litigation and three factors). 
238. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text (discussing absentee prejudice); supra note 
118 and accompanying text (citing concrete example of absentee prejudice created by government). 
239. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2412, 2671 (1982) (Federal Tort 
Claims Act); id. § 1491 (1982) (Court of Claims). The lack of effective relief may implicate due 
process. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 325-28 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing possible due 
process claims); see also Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford, 467 U.S. 51, 59-62 
(1984) (stating that government rarely estopped by unauthorized acts of agents); Union Oil Co. v. 
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975) (United States not estopped by unauthorized acts of agents 
regarding public lands). Moreover, this consideration fundamentally distinguishes public rights 
from private litigation, in which absentees generally can secure some relief in later litigation. See, 
e.g., Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc., 564 F.2d 
816 (8th Cir. 1977). Cases in which the public rights exception was recognized have not engendered 
later suits, but they have prolonged litigation. See supra notes 4, 118. That development implicates 
"public interests" in fair absentee treatment; vindication of interests they assert, such as domestic 
production of oil, when legitimate; and judicial economy, credibility, and respect. See Heckler, 467 
U.S. at 61-62; United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that public has 
interest in government treating citizens fairly). 
240. These might include the costs of trying cases and paying judgments. 
241. Hearing similar claims also implicates judicial economy, credibility, and respect. 
242. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. 
243. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613-14 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal.filed, Nos. 86-
5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
244. See supra notes 221-22, 229 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 221-22, 229, 241 and accompanying text; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) (noting that the multidistrict 
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Judges then should analyze considerations either not stated in the rule or 
those previously examined only indirectly.246 One consideration may be the 
time when the court initially treated the joinder issue. For example, if the ques-
tion were first addressed on appeal, preservation of the judgment, resources 
spent on the trial below, whether absentees knew that litigation was ongoing, 
and why the issue was only treated at this juncture could be important.247 A 
second consideration might be the good faith of the entities whose interests are 
involved, insofar as judges can detect such conduct, and the equities implicated. 
In determining·good faith, judges should ask whether the plaintiff failed to join 
absentees because unaware of their existence, because joinder was infeasible, or 
for strategic purposes. Similarly, the courts should consider whether the gov-
ernmental defendant moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit to prevent absen-
tee prejudice or to avoid a substantive judicial determination that the agency was 
violating its statutory mandate. Concomitantly, courts should ask whether ab-
sentees failed to enter the case because they received no notification, because 
entry would have been relatively inconvenient, or because they hoped to have 
the plaintiff's action dismissed for non-joinder.248 In examining equities, the 
court could ask how substantially the less creditable behavior affected interests 
of other entities and how such conduct might count against those who partici-
pated in the activity. 249 Another consideration could be the effects, not yet 
treated fully, of invoking certain options. For instance, if the suit continued and 
particular absentees were to enter, would the litigation be expedited by their 
contributions to issue resolution or be delayed by their demands that additional 
issues be treated?25° Considerations, such as the relative resources that parties 
litigation option would "create enormous administrative disorder and delay"), aff'd on rehearing, 24 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The 
considerations discussed in this paragraph will rarely control; if they do, however, the inquiry can 
end. 
246. Of course, some of these considerations were mentioned in examining rule 19{b)'s four 
stated factors or in conducting the analysis discussed earlier. See supra note 195 (noting why it is 
proper to consider unstated factors). 
247. Timing can be more problematic in public rights litigation than in traditional private litiga-
tion, because plaintiffs often fail to notify the court of absentees' existence under rule 19(c), while 
governmental defendants have less incentive to notify the court or absentees. See supra notes 136-38 
and accompanying text. For helpful discussions of timing, see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 
1978); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). For more discussion of the timing issue under rules 19 and 24, see 
7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609; 7A c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, 
§ 1916. 
248. Thus, courts evaluating good faith might consider how objectionable the behavior was and 
why entities participated in it. For a helpful example that assesses the conduct of the players, see 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-13 (1968); accord Freer, 
supra note 16, at 1080. 
249. For example, when the moving party seeks dismissal to protect against subsequent suit by 
absentees, "undue delay in making the motion can properly be counted against him as a reason for 
denying the motion." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93; accord Provident 
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 n.4 (1968); see also United States v. 
Sabine Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant's motion on equitable 
grounds, including failure to raise until appeal). Correspondingly, it is often fair to proceed when 
absentees refuse to enter the litigation and the government urges dismissal for non-joinder, because 
government error at once could benefit absentees and be shielded from public scrutiny. 
250. The court in NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other 
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command and the probable outcome on the merits, also may apply.251 
Once all pertinent considerations have been explored, courts should deter-
mine whether one, or a combination, controls.252 Judges should be able to treat 
nearly all remaining cases easily and appropriately, because such a large number 
of considerations ought to have been examined and valued, and because so many 
measures can be invoked. For instance, when a number of important considera-
tions point to the same conclusion, the joinder issue should be easily resolvable. 
More specifically, litigation should proceed when there are national policy issues 
that need resolution and one organization could efficaciously represent many 
dispersed absentees that hold mineral leases on public lands and expedite the 
litigation by offering valuable information on lease issuance.253 But even when 
the situation is less clear, the plethora of considerations and their variable values 
as well as the mechanisms available should mean that courts can reach conclu-
sions rather easily. 
Nonetheless, a miniscule of relatively unclear situations may remain. For 
example, most significant considerations may point to application of different 
measures or to multiple conclusions. Although the inquiry may now appear 
considerably more art than science, and although it is debatable how finely the 
analysis should or can be calibrated, certain techniques can be applied. For ex-
ample, the relevant considerations could be valued in terms of their comparative 
importance and their extent, and balanced. Therefore, judges should re-examine 
these considerations alone,254 or with the plaintiff's and absentees' interests, as 
refined, to determine the appropriate result.255 
grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972), found the potential absentee contribution to issue resolution 
relevant, while the absentees in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), apparently 
could have provided material data about the important issue oflease stipulations' efficacy. See also 
National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1977) (similar relevance as to rule 24). 
Other courts have evinced concern about the effect on the instant litigation of entry of numerous 
absentees. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (mem.), appeal.filed, Nos. 85-5239, 85-
5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); supra note 227 and 
accompanying text; see also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987) 
(in complex litigation, district judge's Rule 24 decision on how best to balance parties rights against 
need to keep litigation from becoming unmanageable entitled to great deference). 
251. Judge Gasch, in Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88, 
(D.D.C. 1986) and Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978), considered 
pertinent the financial hardship to public interest litigants of invoking numerous options. Some 
matters may warrant less weight. Compare 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607, at 64 
n.73 with FED. PROC. L. ED., supra note 177, § 59:76 (opposing views of the relevance of the prob-
able outcome on the merits). For helpful catalogs of additional relevant considerations that may be 
applicable in specific cases, see 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607; FED. PROC. L. 
ED., supra note 177, § 59:76. 
252. The interests of the plaintiff and absentees are not considered at this point, because they 
heretofore have been found relatively similar, and the new considerations may yield a clear 
conclusion. 
253. This apparently is what occurred in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) 
(mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 
1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing similar considerations in context of rule 24). 
254. Plaintiff and absentee interests, because they are relatively similar, will suggest a conclusion 
when one interest and the additional considerations tilt towards this conclusion, as when both favor 
dismissal. 
255. Given everything examined above, it seems virtually inconceivable that any circumstances 
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In sum, rule 19 and additional existing mechanisms enable judges to solve 
the party joinder question in public rights litigation more satisfactorily than the 
public rights exception by accommodating plaintiffs' forum needs and other in-
terests, particularly those of absentees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Numerous federal judges have created, applied, and perpetuated a public 
rights exception to treat a difficult party joinder problem presented by public 
rights litigation. Although a number of judges have attempted to enunciate, 
evaluate, and justify the exception, none has succeeded. Some courts apparently 
fashioned the exception out of solicitude for plaintiffs or concern that rule 19's 
application would effectively preclude public rights cases, but few judges ex-
pressly exhibited regard for additional pertinent interests, especially those of ab-
sentees. Indeed, solicitude for plaintiffs has been excessive and lack of concern 
for other interests inappropriate. Moreover, doubts about rule 19 have been un-
grounded. Application of the rule and additional measures available to courts, 
litigants, absentees, and counsel will permit judges to facilitate plaintiffs' vindi-
cation of public rights and better serve others, namely absentees. Therefore, 
courts should rely on rule 19 and other available mechanisms, rather than en-
gage in cryptic, unclear, and strained analysis to support an exception the appli-
cation of which has engendered protracted litigation, wasted resources, and even 
eroded judicial credibility. 
will remain in which the plaintiff's and absentees' interests are so similar that other relevant consid-
erations and measures available do not tip that delicate balance. In the extremely unlikely event that 
such a situation should arise, the rule's language and underlying policies will not provide a clear 
solution. That phraseology and those policies evince remarkably similar solicitude for plaintiffs and 
absentees, expressing a preference for neither, although the federal judiciary has elevated the plain-
tiff's forum needs to primary significance, see supra note 197. Thus, there may be two "innocent 
parties," each a victim of government error. Perhaps the inquiry then devolves into a philosophical 
debate over the principal purpose of rule 19 as applied in the context of public rights litigation-the 
plaintiff's forum needs, absentee prejudice, and the interests of the judiciary and the public in effica-
cious dispute resolution-that cannot be resolved. 
